摘要
本文以2005—2014年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,采用主成分分析法构建管理层权力的衡量指标,实证检验管理层权力对企业风险承担的影响。研究结果表明,管理层权力越大,风险规避的倾向越明显,企业风险承担水平越低;良好的内外部监督机制能弱化管理层权力对企业风险承担的抑制作用;渠道测试表明,管理层权力通过削弱企业的融资水平规避风险,而对企业投资无显著影响。本文拓展了管理层权力的经济后果及企业风险承担影响因素领域的文献,对引导管理者积极承担风险、加强上市公司内外部治理体系建设、维护中小股东权益具有重要的现实意义。
Using a sample of 2005--2014 Chinese A share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, this paper investigates the impact of managerial power on corporate risk-taking. The results show that the greater the power of management, the more obvious the tendency of risk aversion and the companies＇ risk-taking level becomes relatively low. Effective internal and external monitoring mechanisms can weaken the influence of managerial power on corporate risk-taking. Channel analysis reveals that managerial power reduces corporate risk-taking by weakening companies＇ financing level, but it shows no significant impact on corporate investment activities. This paper extends the literature on the economic significance of managerial power and the determinants of corporate risk-taking. This paper has significant practical values on guiding managers to take risks positively, strengthening the construction of internal and external governance system and safeguarding minority interests of listed companies.
作者
宋建波
文雯
王德宏
申伟
SONG Jian-bo;WEN Wen;WANG De-hong;SHEN Wei(School of Business, Renmin University of China;International Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies University)
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期96-112,共17页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
财政部会计名家培养工程(2017)资助成果
关键词
管理层权力
企业风险承担
内部控制
外部监督
公司治理
managerial power
corporate risk-taking
internal control
external monitoring
corporate governance
