摘要
为研究产权性质、控股股东与企业自主创新三者的关系,以资源基础、动态能力理论为依据,运用泊松、负二项、Zip和Zinb等四个模型,对2006—2015年深圳与上海证券交易所主板上市的公司进行回归分析,发现:(1)控股股东持股比例与企业技术创新活动投入之间呈U型动态关系,具有激励与侵占双重效应,而在创新活动产出方面,上市企业控股股东对企业技术创新活动产出影响主要表现为侵占效应,随着持股比例的增加这种掠夺效应会更显著,进而导致创新效率下降;(2)不论是在国有企业还是在非国有企业中,控股股东持股对企业技术创新活动产出均表现出侵占效应,然而与国有企业的控股股东持股相比,非国有企业的控股股东持股对技术创新活动更具抑制效应。显然,非国有企业的股权集中度对企业的技术创新活动产出有促进作用。
This paper uses Poisson,negative binomial,ZIP and ZINB four regression models to explore the relationship among nature of property rights, controlling shareholders and enterprise independent innovation based on the resource based theory and dynamic capability theory,with sample of Chinese listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the 2006-2015 period. The results indicate that： 1） The shareholding ratios of controlling shareholders show a U-shaped dynamic relationship with the inputs of enterprise technological innovation activities,indicating both incentive effect and entrenchement effect. For the output of innovation activities, controlling shareholders mainly present an entrenchment effect, and this expropriation effect is more pronounced with an increase in their ownership ratio,further leading to a decrease in innovation efficiency. 2） SOEs ’ and non-SOEs ’ controlling shareholders ’ shareholding both has an entrenchment effect on output of enterprise technological innovation activities. Controlling shareholders of non-SOEs have more inhibitory effect than those of SOEs. Meanwhile,a promotional effect on innovation output from ownership concentration of non-SOEs has been observed.
作者
宁青青
陈金勇
袁蒙菡
NING Qingqing;CHEN Jinyong;YUAN Menghan(Business School,Suzhou University,Suzhou 234000,P.R.China;Business School,Hubei University,Wuhan 430062,P.R.China;Accounting School,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,P.R.China)
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期96-107,共12页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
安徽省2014年高校优秀青年人才支持计划项目(2014SQR02)
湖北大学青年科学基金项目"区域
技术创新与企业价值"(098383)
宿州学院优秀学术技术骨干计划项目(2016XJGG02)
关键词
产权
企业自主创新
控股股东
终极控制人
property rights
enterprise independent innovation
controlling shareholders
ultimate controlling shareholders
