摘要
市场需求下降而产能削减不力的去产能粘性现象普遍存在于我国的产能过剩行业。本文以我国产能过剩行业的上市公司为研究对象,从去产能粘性角度实证分析了产权性质与去产能之间的关系。研究发现,产能过剩行业存在着显著的去产能粘性,且由于政府干预尤其是地方政府干预的存在,这种粘性主要存在于地方国有企业,而非国有企业和中央企业的去产能粘性特征不明显,特别是业务量连续三期下降时非国有企业呈现了加速处置过剩产能的积极性。进一步研究发现,地方国有企业去产能粘性受地区市场化进程影响出现了进一步分化,其中中西部地区的地方国有企业去产能粘性表现最为突出;与此同时,地方政府官员面临的晋升压力也制约了企业的去产能动力,在晋升压力较大地区的地方国有企业去产能粘性更大。在影响机理中,政府干预一方面从缓解融资约束层面降低了国有企业处置过剩产能的动力,另一方面从增加人工成本粘性层面提高了国有企业过剩产能退出的壁垒,同时国有企业对政府补助的依赖也在一定程度上弱化了其去产能的动力。
Although the market demand has declined, enterprises do not actively cut capacity. This phenomenon commonly exists in industries with overcapacity. Based on the listed companies in those industries, we analyze the relationship between the nature of ownership and capacity reduction from the perspective of stickiness. We first show that the stickiness of de-capacity significantly exists in industries with overcapacity. As a result of government intervention, especially the intervention from local government, this stickiness is mainly found in local state-owned enterprises（SOEs）, while the stickiness in non-SOEs and central SOEs is not obvious. We also find that non-SOEs cut excess capacity in an accelerating speed when the volume（i.e. sales） has been decreasing for three consecutive periods. Further analysis shows that the stickiness of de-capacity in local SOEs is affected by the marketization process; that is, the stickiness in local SOEs is more prominent in central and western regions. In addition, we find that the pressure of promotion faced by local government officials suppresses local SOEs＇ incentives to cut excess capacity. The stickiness of de-capacity in local SOEs is more pronounced in areas of high promotion pressure, while local SOEs in low-pressure area will actively cut excess capacity when their operation performance has been deteriorating continuously. Finally, we explore the underlying mechanisms through which government interferes with de-capacity. Our results show that government intervention reduces SOEs＇ incentives to dispose of excess capacity by alleviating their financing constraints. In addition, government intervention also sets up barriers for SOEs to withdraw excess capacity by increasing the stickiness of labor cost. Moreover, SOEs＇ dependence on government subsidies also weakens their motivation to reduce excess capacity. Our paper provides a micro perspective to look into the issue of de-capacity and new insights into the driving force for enterprises to reduce overcapacity. Overall, our study sheds light on how to solve the problem of excess capacity.
作者
刘斌
张列柯
Liu Bin;Zhang Lieke(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing Universit)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期109-121,147,共14页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18AGL009)
国家自然科学基金项目(71232004
71372138)
关键词
去产能粘性
产权性质
政府干预
政治晋升
Stickiness of De-capacity
Nature of Ownership
Government Intervention
Promotion of Government Officials
