摘要
为探究如何控制食品安全风险,引入有效抽检率,构建了供应链视角下的食品原材料供应商和食品生产商之间的动态演化博弈模型,并进行了相应的算例分析。结果表明:当政府监管部门对食品生产商和原材料供应商的监管概率都较高时,供应商将提供优质安全的食品原材料,同时食品生产商将选择生产优质安全的食品;当政府监管部门对食品生产商维持一个较高的监管概率,且食品生产商对原材料供应商的有效抽检率也保持在一个较高的水平时,即使政府监管部门对原材料供应商的监管概率较低,也能够保证供应商提供优质安全的食品原材料,同时食品生产商生产优质安全的食品。最后,根据理论分析结果提出了控制食品供应链质量安全风险的相关建议。
The main purpose of this paper is to explore a way that reduces the risk of food quality safety. To solve this problem, the effective sampling rate is introduced to construct the dynamic game model between food raw material suppliers and producers, and the corresponding examples are analyzed. The results show that when the probability of supervision of government regulators on food producers and raw material suppliers are high, suppliers will provide quality and safe food raw materials, and food manufacturers will choose to produce quality and safe food;the effective sampling rates that food producers to raw material suppliers maintain at a high level, as the probability of supervision that government regulators on food producers maintain a high level. In this case, even if government regulators have lower regulatory probabilities for raw material suppliers, the quality and safety of food which provided by raw material suppliers can be ensured. Meanwhile, food manufacturers will choose to produce quality and safe food. Finally, combined with the results of theoretical analysis, the paper puts forward some suggestions to control food quality safety risk in supply chain.
作者
晚春东
秦志兵
吴绩新
WAN Chun-dong;QIN Zhi-bing;WU Ji-xin(College of Business,Shaoxing University,Shaoxing 312000,China;National Engineering Research Center of Seafood,Dalian 116034,China)
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第10期184-192,共9页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"食品供应链质量安全风险演变机理与调控优化模型"(71372175)
关键词
食品供应链
政府监管
有效抽检率
演化博弈模型
食品安全风险
food supply chain
government regulation
effective sampling rate
evolutionary game model
food safety risk
