摘要
在PPP项目中,信息不对称所导致的机会主义行为拉低了项目效率。适当的激励机制可以限制PPP项目中企业的投机行为,减少交易成本,提高公共服务质量。基于委托代理理论,以社会福利最大化以及保障企业基本收益为出发点,设计了双方合作的激励模型,分析了影响企业努力程度以及政府激励政策的各种因素。在此基础上,通过数值分析,重点讨论了项目风险、项目社会效益及经济效益对政府激励政策的影响,发现合理的风险配置可以激励企业在更高水平的努力程度上合作,而根据项目社会效益与经济效益的不同,设计合适的补贴政策与绩效考核机制可以更好地激励企业,保证社会福利。
In the PPP project, the opportunistic behavior caused by asymmetric information has reduced the efficiency of the project. Appropriate incentive mechanism can restrict speculation in PPP projects, reduce transaction costs and improve public service quality. Based on the principal agent theory, the incentive model of cooperation between the two sides is designed based on the maximization of social welfare and the benefit of the enterprise, and the factors that affect the degree of enterprise effort and the government incentive policy are analyzed. On this basis, through numerical analysis, the influence of project risk, project social benefit and economic benefit on government incentive policy is discussed. It is found that reasonable risk allocation can encourage enterprises to cooperate in a higher level of effort, design appropriate subsidies and performance appraisal mechanism according to the difference between the social and economic benefits of the project can also better motivate enterprises and ensure social welfare.
作者
赵卓
李玖灵
Zhao Zhuo;Li Jiuling(College of Economics,Guangdong University of Finance ＆ Economics,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510000)
出处
《改革与战略》
2018年第11期35-40,共6页
Reformation & Strategy
基金
贵州省科技计划项目"供给侧改革视域下贵州省环保产业PPP模式运行机理及规制政策研究"(黔科合基础[2017] 1507)
广东省社科规划项目"产业升级视角下环境规制对经济增长影响机理与实证研究"(GD14CJY10)
广东省教育厅特色创新项目"环境规制
产业结构升级与广东经济增长效应研究"(2014WTSCX137)
关键词
PPP
公私合作
社会资本
委托代理理论
激励机制
PPP
public-private partnerships
social capital
principal-agent theory
incentive mechanism
