摘要
管理层薪酬激励制度的建立对调动管理层积极性、完善公司治理结构、推动上市公司可持续发展具有重要作用,不过管理层也存在运用盈余管理操控公司业绩以提升自身薪酬水平的动机。考虑到我国上市公司大股东控制可能会产生利益侵占效应或利益趋同效应,有必要对大股东的存在及其在公司治理层面的作用机制进行深入研究。鉴于此,可从大股东治理视角出发分析大股东控制程度对管理层薪酬激励与盈余管理关系的影响机制和内在机理,并以中国A股上市公司2009—2017年数据为样本实证检验管理层业绩薪酬激励与盈余管理行为之间的关系,进而结合我国股权结构现状探究大股东控制程度对两者关系的影响机理。研究结果发现,我国上市公司已经普遍建立了与企业业绩相关联的管理层薪酬激励制度,该制度能够在很大程度上限制管理层盈余管理行为,且在大股东控制程度较高的上市公司,其管理层业绩薪酬激励机制降低管理层盈余管理行为的效果更加明显。这表明,我国上市公司管理层业绩薪酬激励机制确实能够在公司治理方面产生积极效应,且伴随着大股东与企业利益的趋同,大股东会借助自身所拥有的对企业的控制权对管理层实施有效监督和约束,从而增强薪酬激励机制对管理层机会主义行为的治理作用,即大股东控制与管理层业绩薪酬激励机制在约束管理层盈余管理行为方面存在互补效应。
Establishment of managerial performance-related pay has important effect on stimulating managerial enthusiasm, improving corporate governance mechanism and promoting corporate sustainable development. However, managers have incentives to manipulate corporate performance and to increase their payment by adopting earnings management. Meanwhile, given that Chinese corporate majority shareholders＇ control is associated with ＂interest entrenchment effect＂ as well as ＂interest alignment effect＂, the existing of majority shareholders and their roles on corporate governance need to be further studied. Based on the perspective of majority shareholders＇ governance, the authors analyze the underlying mechanism through which majority shareholders＇ control impacts on the relation between managerial performance-related pay and earnings management. Meanwhile, the authors adopt Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017, and investigate the relation between managerial performance-related pay and earnings management. Furthermore, the authors consider the current ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and examine whether the above relation changes with the controlling of majority shareholder. It is found that Chinese listed companies establish performance-related pay for their managers, which restricts earnings management behaviors. Especially for companies with increased controlling power of majority shareholders, the effect of performance-related pay on earnings management is more pronounced. The results suggest that performance-related pay for managers is associated with effective corporate governance. As increased interests alignment between majority shareholders and corporate, majority shareholders effectively adopt controlling power to supervise managers＇ behaviors, thus enhance the corporate governance effect of performance-related pay on managerial opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, the authors verify the complementary effect between majority shareholder＇ s controlling and managerial performance-related pay on limiting corporate earnings management.
作者
董丽萍
张军
DONG Li-ping;ZHANG Jun(Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China)
出处
《中国流通经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第12期73-86,共14页
China Business and Market
基金
北京市社会科学基金项目"混合所有制改革背景下北京市国企并购重组绩效提升研究"(18GLB015)
北京市教委重点项目"北京市国有企业混合所有制改革效果及提升路径研究--基于国发[2015]54号文件的准自然实验"(SZ201810037021)
北京市教委面上项目"北京市国企分类分层推进混合所有制改革路径及绩效研究"(SM201910037001)
北京物资学院科技协同攻关团队建设项目"财务供应链管理与决策"(2017GG07)
关键词
管理层
薪酬激励
盈余管理
大股东控制
公司治理
managers
performance-related pay
earnings management
majority shareholder＇ s controlling
corporate governance
