摘要
通过构建微分博弈模型，对比分析无成本分担、成本分担及集中式决策情形下，政府和企业最优反馈均衡策略和收益最优值函数。研究发现，成本分担情形下，企业绿色技术创新努力程度要高于无成本分担情形，该努力程度不仅取决于自身的边际收益，还与政府边际收益、企业技术创新社会收益正相关；集中决策情形下，政府、企业的最优努力水平和系统收益最优值均达到最高水平，且与二者的边际收益之和正相关；社会公众绿色消费的关注程度对系统收益具有正向影响，且影响程度边际递增；各参与主体努力程度对企业社会声誉影响越大，则合作系统收益越大。
By constructing a differential game model, the comparative analysis under without cost-sharing, cost-sharing and centralized decision-making scenarios, government and enterprise optimal feedback equilibrium strategy and benefits the value function. The study finds that under the cost sharing situation, the enterprise＇s green technology innovation efforts are higher than the no-cost sharing sceralo. The degree of effort depends not only on its marginal benefits, but also on the government＇s marginal revenue and enterprise technology innovation social benefits; in the centralized decision-making scenario, the optimal degree of effort of government and enterprises, the optimal of alliance benefits have reached the highest level, and are positively related to the sum of the marginal benefits of the two agents; the degree of concern of the public＇s green consumption has a positive impact on the system＇s benefies, and the degree of influence marginal increment; the greater the influence of the participation degree of each participating entity on the corporate social reputation, the greater the benefit of the cooperation system.
作者
张浩
汪明月
霍国庆
刘宇
ZHANG Hao;WANG Ming-yue;HUO Guo-qing;LIU Yu(School of Public Policy and Management University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100049,China;Institutes of Science and Development,Chinese Academy of Science,Beijing 100190,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2018年第22期85-96,共12页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家重点研发计划“全球变化及应对”重点专项(2016YFA0602500)
关键词
绿色消费关注度
政企合作
绿色技术创新
微分对策模型
green consumption degree
government-enterprise cooperation
green technology innovation
differential game model
