摘要
根据传统经济学的观点 ,工人不愿意承担风险希望得到固定工资 ,企业主承担风险得到利润。但是根据委托代理理论的观点 ,由于信息不对称 ,在无法准确确定工人努力程度的情况下 ,企业主希望运用浮动工资来激励工人努力工作。因此 ,对工人来说 ,工资要尽可能地稳定 ,对企业主来说 ,工资要尽可能地与绩效挂钩。本文给出了权衡这两个约束条件的最优模型。
According to classic economics, employees acquire fix wages to avoid venture, and employers incur venture and gain profits. But the principal agent theory reveals that employers must pay fluctuant wages for workers because of asymmmetry information. So, it is better for employees that wages are as stable as possible,and for employers that wages are fluctuant with profits. This paper gives a model to trade off these two conflicts.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2002年第4期86-87,共2页
Operations Research and Management Science
