摘要
从合作博弈的角度和控制全局损失出发研究了同一流域各利益主体的洪水损失分担问题。假设有多个代理人沿河而居,若代理人之间采取合作,则可能改善洪灾的时空分布,减少总的损失,提高社会福利。因此探讨了该合作博弈的基础——核的特征以及核分配,给出了具体的风险分担方式和子博弈精炼实施方法及最优安全流量的表达式。
The flood loss share by the same river basin but different interest bodies is studied from theangle of cooperative game and global loss control. It is supposed that several agents live along the river,and if the agents choose to cooperate,the total flood loss will decrease,the space-time distribution offlood will improve,the social welfare will increase. The author discusses the base of the cooperativegame,that is characteristic and distribution of core,and presents the concrete risk- share method,subgame implement method and optimum safety flow rate.
作者
吴秀君
WU Xiujun(School of Mathematics and Computer Science ,Jianghan University,Wuhan 430056,Hubei,China)
出处
《江汉大学学报（自然科学版）》
2016年第3期219-223,共5页
Journal of Jianghan University：Natural Science Edition
基金
湖北省统计局研究项目(HB102-09)
湖北省教育厅项目(B20114503)
关键词
核
洪水风险
合作博弈
core
flood risk
cooperative game
