摘要
基于相关文献的报告,在执行禁牧与草畜平衡项目、落实"减畜"目标的过程中,一些地区存在或存在过较为普遍的违规放牧或"偷牧"现象。本文认为,在相关的案例中,经过不同程度强化的草原监理队伍并未担负起相应的职责,这与其所处的冲突性的执法环境有关,更是相关政策设计内在缺陷的结果。由于草原生态补偿机制具有农牧业补贴、边疆民族地区转移支付等经济政治属性,这种补贴暂时不会因为禁牧方面的绩效损失而被取消。但是,随着我国环境政治的逐步高扬,地方政府可能会迫于中央政府或外界的压力,强化对草原生态补奖项目区域内放牧行为的行政管制。
Based on the relevant documents,in the process of implementation of grazing prohibition and grassland and livestock balance project、implementation of goal of“reducing livestock”,the phenomenon of illegal grazing or“surreptitiously grazing”are commonly existed in some areas.The author holds that,in the related cases,the grasslands supervision teams,which have been strengthened by different degrees,did not undertake the corresponding responsibilities.This is related to its conflicting law enforcement environment,and the result of the internal defects of the relevant policy design.Because the grassland ecological compensation mechanism has the economic and political attributes,such as the subsidies for agriculture and animal husbandry,the transfer payment in the border areas,these subsidies will not be canceled for the time being in spite of performance loss of grazing.However,with the gradual improvement of our country’s environment and politics,may be under the pressure of the central government or the outside world,local governments strengthen the administrative control of grazing behavior in grassland ecological compensation award area.
作者
赵宝海
ZHAO Baohai(School of Ethnology and Sociology,Inner Mongolia University,Hohhot,Inner Mongolia,China 010021)
出处
《内蒙古师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2017年第6期123-127,共5页
Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University：Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目"财政驱动型生态治理的社会学研究"(12XJC840003)研究成果之一
关键词
草场管理制度
草原监理
草原生态补奖
grassland management system
grassland supervision
grassland ecological compensation award
