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企业环境绩效与高管薪酬激励有效性研究 被引量:10

Research on Corporate Environmental Performance and the Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Incentive
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摘要 随着企业环境绩效日益受到关注,所有者在薪酬考核和激励过程中越来越多地考虑环境绩效因素。与以往研究直接考察企业环境绩效与高管薪酬水平之间的关系不同,文章以2010-2015年沪深A股重污染行业上市公司为样本,探究企业环境绩效对薪酬激励有效性的影响。研究发现,企业环境绩效显著弱化了国有企业高管薪酬业绩敏感性,尤其是当国有企业所在地面临经济发展压力、企业环境绩效考核压力较大以及股权分散时,这种情况更加突出,然而这种情况在民营企业中却并不存在。上述结果说明由于国有企业预算软约束的存在,使得高管有可能以环境绩效为借口向所有者卸责,进而环境绩效可能成为国有企业高管薪酬激励的新型代理因素。文章以为,国有企业高管的薪酬激励,需要着重关注企业环境绩效的考核。 In pace with the increasing attention to corporate environmental performance,stakeholders tend to take it into consideration during the arrangement of executive compensation contract.Instead of studying the relationship between corporate environmental performance and executive compensation,the paper,taking A-share listed companies in heavy pollution industries in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2015 as samples,investigates the impact of corporate environmental performance on the effectiveness of compensation incentive.The study finds that corporate environmental performance significantly reduces the executive pay-for-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises.Especially,this phenomenon is more prominent in state-owned enterprises in areas suffering from higher economic development pressure and severer assessment of environmental performance as well as with dispersed ownership.However,there is no evidence to support this conclusion in private enterprises.The results reveal that because of the soft budget constraints of state-owned enterprises,the executives are likely to use environmental performance as a shirking excuse,and then the environmental performance may be a new agent factor of executive compensation incentive.This study shows that the executive compensation incentive of state-owned enterprises needs to attach more importance to the assessment of corporate environmental performance.
作者 张正勇 李玉 ZHANG Zheng-yong;LI Yu(School of Accounting,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210023,China;Business School,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)
出处 《华东经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第4期126-133,共8页 East China Economic Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71402068) 江苏高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2016SJB630039) 江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(PAPD)
关键词 企业环境绩效 薪酬业绩敏感性 卸责借口 corporate environmental performance pay-for-performance sensitivity shirking excuse
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