摘要
在宅基地征收过程中,通常会出现一少部分"钉子户"通过拖延或阻止地方政府征收获得更高的补偿价格。强势的地方政府能够有效地阻吓"钉子户"的抵制行为。当地方政府不能够区分"钉子户"和"非钉子户"时,"钉子户"的抵制行为能够提高"非钉子户"获得的补偿价格;反之,则不存在"钉子户"为"非钉子户"提供的外部正效应,而地方政府会因此征收更多数量的宅基地,以获得更高的收益,但农户的整体收益会减少。
In homestead collection,some“Holdout”people usually exist who may obtain higher compensation prices by delaying or preventing local government acquisition.Strong local governments can effectively deter the Holdout s boycott.When local governments cannot distinguish between“nail households”and“non-nail households,”the boycott behavior of“Holdout”can increase the compensation price for“non Holdout”;otherwise,there would be no positive external effects on the“non Holdout”made by the“Holdout”,local governments could collect more homestead land and obtain higher returns with the decrease of farmers overall income.
作者
孙秋鹏
SUN Qiu-peng(Theoretical Innovation Base of Academy of Marxism&Hainan Tropical Ocean University, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)
出处
《北京社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期109-118,共10页
Social Sciences of Beijing
基金
北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心项目(中国政法大学)"马克思主义与全面依法治国"
关键词
宅基地
土地征收
地方政府
农户利益保护
钉子户
rural residential land
land expropriation
local government
protection of the interests of peasantry
Holdout
