摘要
大规模市场兼并重组能否成功实施的关键之一在于各方资产持有者能否就特定资产的价格达成一致。通过考察G省石油市场一场混合所有制重组失败的案例,本文发现存在一种重组双方有对价意愿但对价机制失灵的现象,称之为"对价悖论"。当庇护失灵(地方政府失去保护民营投资者的能力和意愿)、技术失灵(可计量、可操作的对价基础缺失)、话语失灵(投资者的道义诉求超过经济诉求)发生时,面对超经济强制的压力,政府选择通过政治手段解决市场纠纷;但这扭曲了市场权力关系,甚至引发对抗,最终导致对价威权主义的"硬着陆"。对价机制的失灵根植于一种脆弱的不平衡政商关系,政企联盟时的共识,在联盟破裂时反而成为形成对价新共识的阻碍。若要真正推动公私资本的平等混合,应在中央政府、中央国有企业、地方政府、地方国有企业和民营资本之间建立更加平等的利益分配格局和新型政商关系。
One of the key factors for massive market restructure is whether stakeholders can achieve anagreement on a certain asset. Based on a case study of a provincial oil market in China,this article forms a concept of"dilemma of consideration"for a phenomenon that both sides of a merging case have the willingness to reach a deal but the certain mechanisms fail. There are three sorts of failures: the failure of clientelism when the local government loses the capacity and willingness to protect private investors; the failure of techniques when a calculative basis missed; the failure of discourses when the moral appeals surpass the economic appeals. The failures of mechanisms essentially root in an unequal relationship between the state and the entrepreneurs,and ironically,the consensus for the growth coalition turns out to be the obstacles for achieving a new deal for consideration when the coalition collapsed. It calls for a new type of state-business relation based on a more equal configuration among the central government, central state-owned enterprises, local governments, local state-owned enterprises,and private investors for a sustainable growth of private and public sectors.
出处
《社会发展研究》
2018年第4期86-104,共19页
Journal of Social Development
基金
教育部重大课题攻关项目“深化‘放管服’改革促进营商环境持续优化研究”(主持人:聂辉华)的阶段性成果之一
