摘要
通过对经典的Hotelling模型进行改进,建立双寡头垄断市场中存在盗版时信息产品厂商的竞争定价模型,求解得到最优定价及最优收益的解析解。然后进行数值分析,讨论盗版获取成本、网络效应、盗版产品效用折扣与正版厂商定价、收益以及市场需求之间的变化关系,并探讨了市场中一方盗版获取成本变动对竞争对手经营决策的影响。结果表明:厂商最优定价和收益随着盗版获取成本的增加而增大,但随着网络效应和盗版产品效用折扣的增大呈现递减趋势;盗版获取成本和盗版产品效用折扣的提高会降低产品的市场需求,但在既定的盗版获取成本下,网络效应的存在会扩大厂商的市场需求;市场中两方厂商共同提高消费者盗版获取成本是实现两者最大收益的最佳选择。
By improving the classic Hotelling model,this paper established the competitive pricing model of information product manufacturers in duopoly market with the presence of piracy,and the analytical solution of optimal pricing and optimal profit were obtained.After that,a numerical analysis was conducted.The relationship between piracy acquisition costs,network effects,utility discounts on pirated products and the pricing,revenue,and market demand of genuine vendors were analyzed.At the same time,it discussed the influence of one party s attitude towards piracy on the other s business decision-making in the competitive market.The results show that the optimal price and profits of firms improve with the increase of piracy acquisition costs,and decrease with the increase of network effects and utility discounts on pirated products.The increase of piracy acquisition costs and utility discounts on pirated products will reduce product market demand,but in the established cost of piracy acquisition,the existence of network effects will expand the market demand.In addition,two genuine manufacturers boycotting piracy to increase consumer piracy acquisition costs can achieve more revenue.
作者
王松
丁霞
李芳
WANG Song;DING Xia;LI Fang(School of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China)
出处
《科技与管理》
2019年第1期68-75,共8页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71603151)
山东社会科学规划研究项目(18CGLJ38)
山东科技大学科研创新团队支持计划(2015TDJH103)
