摘要
审计独立是近代中国审计立法和审计制度构建的主要原则,但近代中国的审计制度并未真正实现独立。清末新政筹设独立审计机关是为牵制内阁、巩固皇权;民国北京政府时期的审计处隶属于行政机关,此后的审计院为大总统控制,皆非独立;国民政府时期,审计的独立性有所加强,但在国民党独裁专政之下,审计机关的独立性相对有限。近代中国独立型审计制度及其实践表明,审计制度效能的发挥需要良好政治体制的支撑以及完备财政制度的配合,应赋予审计机关强有力的监督手段,并给予审计人员以特殊的职务保障。
Audit independence is the main principle of auditing legislation and audit system construction in modern China,but modern Chinese auditing system has not really achieved independence. In the late Qing Dynasty,independent audit institutions were set up to contain the cabinet and consolidate the imperial power. The audit offices of the Beijing government in the Republic of China were subordinate to the administrative organs,and since then the audit houses were under the control of the President and were not independent; during the period of the National Government,the independence of audit had been strengthened,but under the dictatorship of the Kuomintang,the independence of audit organization was relatively limited. The independent audit system and its practice in modern China show that the effectiveness of the audit system needs the support of a good political system and the cooperation of perfecting financial system,with auditing organs endowed with a powerful means of supervision and auditors given special job security.
作者
李相森
LI Xiangsen(School of Law,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)
出处
《南京审计大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第1期1-8,共8页
Journal of Nanjing Audit University
基金
江苏高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2017SJB0326)
南京审计大学政府审计研究课题(GAS171007)
关键词
审计独立
监审合一
独立型审计制度
中央审计委员会
国家审计
审计机关
政府审计
国家治理
audit independence
integration of supervision and audit
independent auditing system
the Central Audit Committee
state audit
auditing offices
government audit
national governance
