摘要
立足于对农村征地冲突中不同利益诉求及其相互关系的研究,探讨当前农村征地制度和征地过程中多方利益的冲突与协调问题。运用演化博弈论和实证分析法对高铁公共交通基础设施建设项目征地案例进行分析,厘清了中央政府、地方政府与失地农民三者两两之间演化博弈的关系与过程,研究表明:(1)中央政府与地方政府、失地农民的博弈中,主要考虑中央政府在地方政府违规时监管尽力的收益、中央政府实施介入的成本、监管失效带来的损失等因素;(2)地方政府与中央政府、失地农民的博弈中,主要考虑地方政府选择违规的额外收益、中央政府对地方政府违规的罚款等因素;(3)失地农民与中央政府、地方政府的博弈中,主要考虑失地农民上访的概率、失地农民上访的成本等因素。并提出化解征地冲突可以从完善土地征用制度、规范征地程序、加强中央政府的监督职能和地方政府的权利管制及合理处理争议等政策建议。
In this paper,the conflicts and coordination of the interests of multiple participants in the current rural land acquisition system and land acquisition process were discussed,based on the study of different interest demands and their mutual relations in rural land acquisition conflicts.The relationship and process of the evolutionary game among the central government,local government and the landless peasants were clarified,using evolutionary game theory and empirical analysis to analyze the case of land acquisition of public transportation infrastructure construction projects taking high-speed rail as an example.The results showed that:(1)In the game among the central government,local governments and landless peasants,factors such as the central government's revenue in monitoring local government violations,the cost of central government’intervention and the loss due to regulatory failure should be mainly considered.(2)In the game among local governments,the central government and landless peasants,factors such as the extra profits of local governments’violation and the central government fines for local governments’violation should be mainly considered.(3)In the game among landless peasants,the central government and local governments,the probability and cost of landless peasants'petition should be considered.Moreover,in the paper it was put forward that the conflicts over land and acquisition could be resolved from four aspects:perfecting land expropriation institution,strengthening the supervision function of central government,the right control of local government and reasonably handling disputes.
作者
韩璐
鲍海君
邓思琪
曾新
HAN Lu;BAO Hai-jun;DENG Si-qi;ZENG Xin(Institute of Land and Urban and Rural Development,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Public Administration,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)
出处
《广东农业科学》
CAS
2018年第12期131-136,共6页
Guangdong Agricultural Sciences
基金
浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目(18NDJC142YB)
国家社会科学基金(16ZDA020)
国家自然科学基金(41371187
71704152)
浙江省自然科学基金(LQ17G030005)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(16YJC630030)
关键词
农村征地
演化博弈模型
利益相关者
高铁
rural land acquisition
volutionary game model
stakeholders
high-speed rail
