摘要
采用规范分析与演绎推导的方法从契约利益主体关系和集中契约内生属性两个层面厘清林地规模化转出的集中契约内生威胁,探究集中契约的稳定治理措施。研究表明:集中契约中的利益主体关系演变会打破铁三角的均衡关系,降低契约的有效性与稳定性;利益主体在履约过程中由于价值观变化、心理契约失衡和契约内容不够灵活与完备致使集中契约长期稳定存在一定威胁。为此,从契约利益主体间权利、义务和责任以及契约治理两个层面提出增强林地规模流转集中契约的稳定性对策,以巩固和深化林权改革,促进林地规模化经营与产业化发展。
⑴Background--In recent years,centralized contractual behavior of forestland scale transfer has been prevalent in rural forestland market.In this behavior pattern,the three types of stakeholders,who are respectively the forest farmers as the outflow parties of forestland property rights,the village collectives(or local township governments)as the intermediary organizations and the social capital as the inflow parties,jointly participate in the signing of the contract,and share the resource allocation benefits of the transfer of forestland property rights and the residual value of the economic behavior of property rights.⑵Methods--Using the method of normative analysis and deductive derivation,from the two aspects of the relationship between contractual interests and the endogenous attributes of the contract,the endogenous threats of centralized compaction of large-scale transfer of forest land are clarified,and the stable governance measures of centralized contract are explored.⑶Results--In the centralized contract of forestland scale transfer,the three types of stakeholders:the outflow party,the intermediate party and the inflow party,form a balanced interest relationship of iron triangle by the principal agent and the market contract,and establish a long-term and relatively low-cost centralized contract of large-scale forestland resource transfer with the participation of multiple independent stakeholders.Due to the inconsistency of stakeholders power,status and behavioral ability in the contract,the strong parties threaten to occupy the residual value of the weak parties in the interest chain,which leads to the unbalance of the iron triangle relationship.At the same time,when the value changes of stakeholders,social changes and other emergencies occur,the long-term nature of the centralized contract,the“pseudo”normativeess of the process and the incompleteness of the content are likely to imbalance the psychological contract of stakeholders,induce opportunistic behavior,and reduce the stability of the contract.Therefore,the research puts forward the governance measures for the stability of centralized contract of forestland scale transfer from two aspects:first,starting from the stakeholders of contract participation,we should strengthen farmers awareness of forest land property rights and enhance their capacity of property rights behavior,give play to the social control means of the village collective and local governments,strengthen social recognition and strengthen social capital reputation,social responsibility and organizational culture;second,starting from contract governance,we should establish sound and standardized trading procedures and transfer system,build relational contract to maintain psychological contract balance,and design flexible contract content and structure to ensure that the centralized contract of forestland transfer can be sustainable and efficient in the long-term implementation process.⑷Conclusions and Discussions--The scale management benefit of forestland resources is prominent,which makes the scale transfer of forestland more common,and the high trading cost and the fragmentation and dispersion of the division of forestland resources property rights make the centralized contract of forestland property rights transfer become efficient.Therefore,the research on the stability of centralized contract has become an important topic.Faced with the threat factors of the stability of centralized contract,it is not only necessary to maintain the effectiveness of centralized contract from the aspects of rights,obligations and responsibilities among the contractual stakeholders,but it also needs to conduct the stability governance of centralized contract from contract system and norms of transfer,content design,psychological contract balance and other aspects,in order to consolidate and deepen the reform of forest rights,promote the large-scale management and industrialization development of forestland,and further improve the behavior research of rural land scale transfer.
作者
徐冬梅
刘豪
高岚
XU Dongmei;LIU Hao;GAO Lan(School of Economics and Management,Shanxi Agricultural University,Jinzhong,Shanxi 030801 China;School of Economics and Management,Shihezi University,Shihezi,Xinjiang 832000 China;School of Economics and Management,South China Agricultural University,Guangzhou 510642 China)
出处
《林业经济问题》
北大核心
2019年第1期23-29,共7页
Issues of Forestry Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473088)
广东省人文社科重大项目(2014WZDXM009)
关键词
林地流转
集中契约
威胁
稳定性
契约治理
forestland transfer
centralized contract
threat
stability
contract governance
