摘要
通过分析当今环境保护政策和超标排放污染物企业实际情况,将利润率、综合税率、惩罚性罚款基数和环保督察成本等影响因素,融入到地方政府与超标排放污染物企业间的演化博弈过程中,用以模拟退出决策过程。研究表明:在不同的初始状态下,当地方政府选择的环保督察力度较小时,超标排放污染物企业采取不退出的策略;当地方政府选择的环保督察力度较大时,超标排放污染物企业采取退出的策略。当初始状态一定时,地方政府可以通过降低超标排放污染物企业利润率、增大综合税率、加大惩罚性罚款数额等方法,促使超标排放污染物企业退出市场。
By analyzing the current environmental protection policies and the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises’actual situation,the influencing factors,such as profit rate,comprehensive tax rate,punitive penalty base and environmental protection supervision are integrated into the evolutionary game between local governments and exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises,are used to simulate exit decision process.It is concluded that,under different initial conditions,the enterprises adopt not exit strategy when the local government environmental protection inspectors are small;when the local government environmental protection inspectors are strong,the enterprises adopt exit strategy.When the initial state is certain,local governments can take measures such as reducing the profit margin of exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises,increasing the comprehensive tax rate,increasing the punitive penalty base,which will push the exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises to exit the market.
作者
王强
谭忠富
谭清坤
蒲雷
德格吉日夫
WANG Qiang;TAN Zhongfu;TAN Qingkun;PU Lei;DE Gejirifu(North China Electric Power University of Economics and Management,Beijing,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期280-285,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573084)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2018ZD14)
关键词
超标排放污染物企业
环保督察
退出机制
演化博弈
exceeding pollution emission standards enterprises
environmental protection supervision
exit mechanism
evolutionary game
