摘要
给予折扣优惠是销售方的商业定价行为,具有一定诱导效应,可刺激购买方增加购买量且使消费者获利,属于正常市场竞争行为。忠诚折扣特殊性在于其根据相对人在交易过程中的忠诚程度给予不同折扣力度,产生反竞争性封锁效应。通过讨论忠诚折扣的运作模式,明确其行为性质定性及认定规则,立足国内规制现状,明确其对竞争的实质影响及是否属于竞争法规制范围。只有经过比对其正负效果,方能对忠诚折扣行为作出适当的规制。
Giving discount is a commercial pricing behavior of the seller, and it has an induction effect in some degree, which can stimulate the buyer to increase the purchase amount. It is a normal market competition behavior. Loyalty discount is different from general discount, and it gives different discount intensity according to the degree of loyalty of the relative party in the transaction process, and produces actual or potential anti-competitive blocking effect, crowding out competitors and dividing the market. At present, our country has framed the loyalty discount behavior in "the bottom clause", and has made an innovative step in the treatment and characterization of loyalty discount. But such qualitative rationality is still controversial. This paper discusses the operation mode of loyalty discount, defines the nature of its behavior and rules, analyzes the current situation of domestic regulation and its actual influence on competition and whether it belongs to the scope of competition law. Only through comparison of positive and negative effects can we make proper regulation on the behavior of loyalty discount.
作者
陈静
Chen Jing(Law School , Anhui University , Hefei , Anhui 230011,China)
出处
《黑龙江工业学院学报（综合版）》
2019年第2期109-114,共6页
Journal of Heilongjiang University of Technology(Comprehensive Edition)
关键词
忠诚折扣
利乐案
滥用市场支配地位
限定交易
loyalty discount
Tetra pak case
abuse of market dominance
limited trade
