摘要
重大行政决策社会稳定风险评估(简称"稳评")的效力在目前呈现为"仅供参考"和"一票否决"两种模式。"仅供参考"必然导致"稳评"程序的异化和萎缩。"一票否决"则极大刺激了地方政府的操纵行为,非但不能促使其落实社会风险防控责任,反而有助于其推卸责任,并给评估的推行者、负责者和实施者带来巨大风险。因此,必须对"稳评"的效力进行弹性、折中的设计。"稳评"的结果应当成为行政决策的重要依据之一,但并非与决策结果一一对应;决策机关未必需要按照"稳评"结果做出决策,但应当就"稳评"结果和行政决策之间的关系进行充分说理;"稳评"结果的效力还应当与其揭示的风险点,以及由这些风险点所引发的社会安全事件的问责紧密联系起来。
At present, there are two modes,“for reference only”and“one-vote veto”, presenting in the effectiveness of social stability risk assessment (SSRA for short) of major administrative decision-making. The first mode will inevitably lead to the alienation and shrinkage of the procedure of SSRA, while the second mode greatly stimulated the manipulation of local governments which, instead of promoting the implementation of responsibility of social risk prevention and control, it helps them to pass the buck, and also brings great risks to the promoter, the responsible party, and the implementer of the evaluation. Therefore, it is necessary to design the effectiveness of SSRA flexibly and eclectically. The result of SSRA should become one of the important bases of administrative decision-making, but it does not correspond with the decision-making result;decisions do not need to be made by policy-making organs according to the result of SSRA, but the relationship between the result of SSRA and administrative decision-making should be fully illustrated;the effectiveness of the result of SSRA should also be closely related to the risk points it reveals and the accountability of social security events caused by these risk points.
出处
《北京行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期44-52,共9页
Journal of Beijing administration institute
基金
中国政法大学钱端升杰出学者支持计划项目(DSJCXZ180416)
关键词
社会稳定风险评估
“稳评”效力
风险定级
风险化解
social stability risk assessment (SSRA)
effectiveness of SSRA
level assessment of risk
solution of risk
