摘要
带初始禀赋的公共资源分配问题中,机制设计者需要通过分配机制实现这些稀缺资源的有效分配。现行常用的序列优先机制存在有效性不足的问题,而且由于外部性或社会伦理等问题,通常在实践中不能借助货币对其重新配置,这就需要引入物物交换机制来优化序列优先机制的效率。本文分析了在肾脏移植匹配和租房交换市场中设计的首位交易循环—链机制,发现两者之间存在着细微的差别。由于不要求参与者退回初始禀赋,在肾脏移植匹配中使用的首位交易循环—链机制对序列优先机制的优化具备可行性,但并不帕累托有效。为进一步定量分析该机制的有效性,本文对其在骨髓移植捐赠匹配中的优化效率做了计算机仿真模拟,结果发现相对于现行的序列优先机制,首位交易循环—链机制能够大幅度提高匹配效率,同时也能够将1年生存率提高30%左右。本文还对仿真模拟中的四个参数,即患者数量、相关供者比例、无关供者数量以及错配容忍度做了敏感性分析,发现序列优先机制对四个参数都比较敏感,而交易循环—链机制对无关供者数量变化不敏感但对其他三个参数较敏感。
In the problem of public resource allocation with initial endowment, the mechanism designer needs to realize the effective allocation of these scarce resources through the allocation mechanism. The current commonly used Serial Dictatorship mechanism is not Pareto Efficiency. And due to externalities or social ethics, it is usually not reconfigured by money in practice. This requires the introduction of the efficiency of the pure economics mechanism to optimize the Serial Dictatorship mechanism. This paper qualitatively analyzes the Top Trading Cycle and Chain mechanism designed in the kidney transplant matching and housing market, and finds that there are subtle differences between the two. Since the participants are not required to return to the initial endowment, the transaction cycle-chain mechanism used in the kidney transplant matching is feasible to optimize the Serial Dictatorship mechanism, but it is not effective. In order to further quantitatively analyze the effectiveness of this mechanism, this paper conducted a computer simulation of the optimization efficiency of bone marrow transplantation donation matching. The simulation results show that compared with the current Serial Dictatorship mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle and Chain mechanism can greatly improve the matching efficiency, and can also increase the one-year survival rate by about 30%. Finally, the paper analyzes the four parameters in the simulation: number of patients, proportion of paired donors, number of single donors, and mismatch tolerance: the Serial Dictatorship mechanism is sensitive to all four parameters, and the Top Trading Cycle and Chain mechanism is insensitive to changes in the number of unrelated donors but is sensitive to the other three parameters.
作者
王湛
韩袈鑫
WANG Zhan;HAN Jia-xin(School of Economics,Southwest University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期174-192,共19页
China Industrial Economics
关键词
骨髓移植
公共资源分配
首位交易循环-链
序列优先机制
bone marrow transplantation
public resource allocation
top trading cycle and chain
serial dictatorship mechanism
