摘要
中央向地方的财政与行政分权赋予地方官员辖区经济自主权,但地方官员的经济行政权力并未受到制度的有力约束,从而形成具有中国特色的财政分权体制。中国式财政分权在激励地方官员发展辖区经济的同时,也引发地方官员短视行为、政府主导型经济、偏向性招商引资政策和政企合谋等问题,进而削弱各类市场主体的技术创新激励。基于中国改革开放以来的省级面板数据,实证研究发现,财政分权显著负向影响专利强度和研发强度。考虑测量误差、反向因果、遗漏变量等因素后,实证结果保持稳健。完善官员监管体系、减少政府经济干预,方能进一步释放财政分权体制的经济增长潜力。
Decentralization of financial and administrative powers from the central government to the local government gives local officials economic autonomy, but the economic and administrative powers of local officials are not strongly constrained by the system, thus forming a fiscal decentralization system with Chinese characteristics. Fiscal decentralization with Chinese characteristics induces local official’s short-sighted behaviors, government-dominated economy, biased competition policy, and collusion. This paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis that fiscal decentralization in China hampers technological innovation. Based on a provincial-level panel data since China’s reform and opening-up, the paper finds that fiscal decentralization has significant and negative effects on both patents and R&D. When measurement errors, reverse causality and omitted variables are taken into consideration, empirical results remain robust. Strengthening official supervision horizontally and reducing government intervention in the economy are essential for China’s sustainable economic growth.
作者
吴延兵
WU Yanbing(Institute of Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100044,China)
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期13-25,共13页
Modern Economic Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“经济转型期技术创新的制度影响因素研究”(14BJY019)
关键词
财政分权
技术创新
官员激励
经济干预
专利
研发
Fiscal decentralization
Technological innovation
Local officials’ incentives
Economic intervention
Patents
Research and development
