摘要
信号理论相关研究认为专利可以作为一种质量信号,帮助企业获得投资者的认可,缓解企业融资约束。本文基于信号环境和信号有效性的理论关系,探索了中国情境下政府政策演变对专利融资作用的影响,评估了近十年来各地推行的专利质押政策的政策效果。基于2000~2015年11621个企业-年度观测值的面板数据与广义双差分(DID)政策评价模型分析结果显示,专利缓解了中国企业的融资约束,但仅限于发明专利;同时,地方政府推行专利质押政策总体上并没有加强专利的融资作用。事后分析进一步指出,专利质押政策效果在技术交易发达地区却是显著的。该结果意味着政策效果的发挥还依赖于市场完善度,投资者对信号的认可度受到制度和市场环境的共同影响。
Studies based on signaling theory argue that patents could work as quality signal,helping firms win approval from investors and thus relieving their financial constraint. Studies also suggest that the signaling reliability of patent depends on the institutional environment within and across different countries. However,how institutional environment change impacts patent signal remains largely underdeveloped. Based on the theoretical relationship between signaling environment and signaling reliability,this research has evaluated the evolution of Chinese government policies in the past ten years,specifically the implementation of patent pledging policy,and examined how it may e enhance the financing role of patents. We collected data of all firms listed on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market,excluding firms in financial industry to test our hypotheses. The final panel dataset included 11,621 firm-year observations of 3,407 firms from 2000 to 2015. The provincial-level patent pledging policy information by the end of2016,coded as a dummy variable,was collected from a law database. To examine the policy effect,a generalized difference-indifference( DID) model( instead of a classical DID model) was used as the estimation strategy,because the policy enforced varied across provinces. We also tested the hypothesis with propensity score matching method to verify the robustness of our DID model.The results showed that patents did relax financial constraints,but only for invention patents in our research context. Meanwhile,the patent pledging policy did not enhance the financing effect of invention patents based on the results of the generalized DID model. The robustness test also supported these findings,indicating that the policy in general was not effective. Post-hoc test further suggested the policy effect was significant in provinces with advanced technology transaction market,implying that policy effect depended on the development level of market,and the acceptance of investors on patent signals was jointly shaped by institution and market environment. This study enriches understandings on how institutional environment matters for patent signal and provides some implications for policy making.
作者
郑莹
张庆垒
Ying Zheng;Qinglei Zhang(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing Tech University;School of Marketing and Logistic Management,Nanjing University of Finance & Economics)
出处
《管理学季刊》
2019年第1期55-72,100,共19页
Quarterly Journal of Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“战略视角下企业专利期权放弃行为研究”(18YJC630265)
江苏省社会科学基金青年项目“专利资产的融资价值研究”(18GLC004)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目“基于专利质押融资机制的政策评价研究”(2018SJA0205)资助
关键词
信号理论
融资约束
专利质押
政策评价
signaling theory
financing constraint
patent pledge
policy evaluation
