摘要
我国银行卡支付产业的业务许可制度通过准入限制给产业带来了特许权价值,但与此同时产业却呈现风险高发的态势。这与特许权价值假说是相悖的,该假说认为特许权价值具有内生的风险约束效应。本文以银行卡支付产业的网络效应为切入点,通过理论构建和案例分析,论证了当支付机构以序贯方式进入银行卡支付市场时,后进入支付机构不仅自身提供的服务风险水平比先进入支付机构的高,而且还推高了先进入支付机构和行业整体的风险水平。银行卡支付产业特许权价值不具有内生的风险约束效应,反而激励了支付机构采取风险更高的经营行为。
Though the licensing system of the bankcard payment industry in China has created the franchise value through the entry restriction, the industry has gone into a high risk situation. It is contrary to the franchise value hypothesis, which argues that franchise value has endogenous risk-constraining effect. This paper begins with the cutting point of the network of bankcard industry and demonstrates that as payment institutions enter sequentially into the bankcard payment market, the entry of new-coming institutions improve the overall level of the industry’s risk-taking. Franchise value of bankcard payment industry does not have endogenous risk-constraining effect, so it is necessary to strengthen the external regulations.
作者
蒋小敏
JIANG Xiaomin(Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai,201209)
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期122-136,共15页
China Economic Studies
关键词
网络效应
特许权价值竞争
风险承担
风险约束效应
network externality
franchise value competition
risk-taking
risk-constraining effect
