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论我国保荐机构先行赔付行为的法律性质 被引量:1

On the Legal Nature of the Sponsor Institution’s Advance Compensation Behavior in China
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摘要 我国已经出现了保荐机构先行赔付证券投资者的实践,但现行《证券法》对此却没有设置具体的规定。对于这一行为的法律性质,亦没有引起证券法学界的足够重视。对该问题现有的几种学说,如"保证说""和解说""先付责任说"均有瑕疵。经考量,"单方允诺说"为最合理的解释。只有正确界定保荐机构先行赔付行为的法律性质,才能为以后《证券法》修订时该制度的具体设计提供有益的参考。 China has already experienced the practice of sponsoring institutions to pay off securities investors in advance,but the current Securities Law has no specific provisions. The legal nature of this behavior has not attracted enough attention from the securities law community. Several existing theories on this issue,such as "Guarantee,""Harmony," and " Advance compensation " are all flawed. After considered and discussed,"unilateral promise" is the most reasonable explanation. Only by correctly defining the legal nature of the sponsor's prepayment compensation behavior can it provide a useful reference for the specific design of the system when the Securities Law is revised in the future.
作者 秦琛 QIN Chen(Kenneth Wang School of Law,Soochow University,JiangSu Soochow 215000)
出处 《上海市经济管理干部学院学报》 2019年第5期42-48,共7页 Journal of Shanghai Economic Management College
关键词 证券 保荐机构 先行赔付 单方允诺 Securities Sponsor Institution Advance Compensation Unilateral Promise
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