摘要
物流设施外迁导致配送活动负外部性增加,损害了公众福利.本文应用演化博弈论对政府运用经济政策干预城市配送中心布局问题进行了研究,建立了政府和配送企业的静态演化博弈模型,并在模型中考虑了消费者绿色偏好,分析了政府和配送企业的相互作用机理.此外,还建立了动态税收演化博弈模型,探究动态税收机制下博弈系统演化方向.通过仿真计算,对比了静态和动态干预机制的优劣;并对税收和消费者绿色偏好系数做了灵敏度分析.研究结果表明,静态机制下演化博弈系统无法达到渐进稳定状态,动态税收机制下系统能够达到渐进稳定状态,而且税收水平和消费者绿色偏好水平对配送企业抉择有显著影响.
Logistics sprawl has leaded to the increase of negative externalities of distribution activities, which has damaged the public welfare. This paper applies the evolutionary game theory to study the governmental intervention mechanism for the layout of urban distribution centers, establishes a static evolutionary game model between the government and distribution enterprises with considering consumers' green preferences, and analyzes the interaction mechanism between the government and distribution enterprises. Moreover, dynamic tax evolutionary game model is established to explore the direction of system evolution under the dynamic scenario. In the simulation, we compare the merits and demerits of the two scenarios, and make a sensitivity of taxation and consumers' green preferences. The research results show that the evolutionary game system can't reach the asymptotic stable state under the static mechanism, but can reach the asymptotic stable state under the dynamic taxation mechanism, and the level of taxation and consumers' green preference has a significant impact on the decision-making of distribution enterprise.
作者
卫振林
李世龙
WEI Zhen-lin;LI Shi-long(School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China)
出处
《交通运输系统工程与信息》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第5期7-12,41,共7页
Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
基金
国家重点研发计划(2018YFB1601600)~~
关键词
物流工程
城市配送中心
演化博弈论
设施布局
干预机制
物流设施外迁
logistics engineering
urban distribution centers
evolutionary game theory
facility layout
intervention mechanism
logistics sprawl
