摘要
本文用经济学分析及实证的方法研究了中国证券市场关于信息披露的欺诈行为。结论是 :当监管加强 ,欺诈的预期成本增加 ,欺诈上市减少 ,反之 ,欺诈上市增加 ;当一股独大时 ,市场监督容易失效 ,便产生持续信息披露上的欺诈行为 ,此时 ,社会公众股东承担的总成本是无欺诈条件下的代理成本与受欺诈导致的成本之和 ;监督失效时 ,削弱了诚实公司潜在的长期融资能力。实证结果表明 ,欺诈公司及其高层管理人员所受处罚量与其欺诈行为量的相关度很差 ,处罚的公平性值得商榷。
This paper, using economic and positivist analysis, studies the swindling act about information disclosure in China's securities markets. It is concluded that if the supervision is intensified, reduced is the fraud in listing; conversely, it is increased. When there is only one strong stock in the market, the supervision is apt to be void, thus arising persistent swindling acts in information disclosure. At this very moment, the gross cost the social public stockholders are undertaking is the sum of the agency cost without fraud and the cost resulted from fraud, which weakens the potential long-run financial capacity of those honest companies. The positivist result shows that the degree of the correlation is very poor between the penalty amount upon the cheating company and its high management and the amount of fraud they conduct. Therefore, the fairness of the penalty is open to question.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第6期1-6,共6页
Modern Economic Science
基金
浙江省2002年度社会科学规划课题XK0 2- 44号
