摘要
机构投资者因具有持股优势和专业优势,积极参与上市公司治理,有助于缓解上市公司治理中的委托代理问题,降低上市公司的监督成本,提高上市公司的治理效率。然而,实践中,不同类型的机构投资者因投资理念、投资偏好的差异,参与上市公司治理的动机并不相同,所产生的治理绩效也可能不同。尤其是其短期财务投资的行为偏好,使机构投资者在参与上市公司治理后,很可能引发短期财务利益与上市公司长期利益冲突,甚至会为了自身的短期利益而否定公司的长期经营方针。为此,需要从设置机构投资者持股锁定期、加强机构投资者信义义务等角度,对机构投资者参与上市公司治理的行为进行法律规制,以促使其为上市公司治理结构的完善真正发挥积极作用。
Due to shareholding advantage and professional competence, institutional investors’ active participation in the listed companies’ governance would help to alleviate their principal-agent problem, reduce supervision costs for them and improve their governance efficiency. However, in practice, different types of institutional investors have different motivation to participate in the governance of listed companies because of their divergences in investment philosophy and investment preferences, thus their governance performance may also be distinct. In particular,institutional investors participation in the listed companies’ governance their behavioral preference of short-term financial investment is likely to trigger a conflict with the listed companies’ long-term interests, and may even to deny the company’s long-term business policy for their own short-term interests. Therefore, we need to set institutional investors’ s hares lock-up period and strengthen legal regulation on institutional investors’ participation in the listed companies’ governance from the perspective of strengthening their fiduciary duty etc., so as to enable them to play a positive role in improving the governance structure of listed companies.
作者
赵敏
赵立立
ZHAO Min;ZHAO Lili(School of Economics,East China University of Political Science and Law,shanghai 200333)
出处
《上海市经济管理干部学院学报》
2019年第4期10-16,共7页
Journal of Shanghai Economic Management College
关键词
机构投资者
上市公司治理
持股锁定期
信义义务
Institutional Investor
Listed Company Governance
Shares Lock-up Period
Fiduciary Duty
