摘要
针对私家车出行方式选择问题,引入HOT(high-occupancy toll)车道待征,构建了管理部门和出行者之间策略选择演化博弈模型,并分析了管理成本、收费政策、独驾者选择行驶HOT车道等相关因素对演化结果的影响。结果表明:不同初始比例下最终收敛的稳定状态都为(1,1),并且初始比例越大,收敛速度越快;对非合乘者的收费、管理成本以及选择行驶HOT车道的非合乘者比例对博弈结果都会产生较大影响;对非合乘者的收费高于一定值时,管理部门设置HOT车道及出行者选择合乘方式是最佳博弈状态。
In view of the issue of private car travel mode select io n?HOT(high occupancy toll/lanes)lanes features were introduced.An evolutionary game model of strategic choice between management departments and travelers was constructed.The influence of management costs,charging policy,choosing HOT lanes by solo drivers and other related factors on the evolution results was analyzed.The results show that:1)the steady state of final convergence under different initial ratios is(1.1),and the larger the initial ratio,the faster the convergence speed;2)the charging for non combiners,the management costs*and the ratio of the non combiners who choose driving on HOT lanes will have a greater impact on the outcome of the game;3)when the charge for non combiners is higher than a certain value,it is the best game state for the management department to set HOT lanes and the travelers to choose the carpool mode,which provides a reference for the management department to set HOT lanes to encourage the travelers to choose the carpool mode and make toll policy.
作者
周丽珍
张巧格
徐天东
ZHOU Lizhen;ZHANG Qiaoge;XU Tiandong(School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,P.R.China;College of Design,Construction and Planning.University of Florida,Gainesville 32611,Florida,USA)
出处
《重庆交通大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第11期104-110,共7页
Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目71671109
上海自然科学基金项目(18zr1416900)
关键词
交通运输工程:出行方式选择:HOT车道
合乘
演化博弈
traffic and transportation engineering
travel model selection
HOT(high-occupancy toll/lanes)lanes
carpool
evolutionary game
