摘要
作为宪法上的重大制度,合宪性审查既是一项法律安排也是一项政治安排,既具有法律方面的功能又具有政治方面的功能。中国需立足自身的政治结构和国家权力运行体制,探索发展合宪性审查的中国道路。在“八二宪法”确立的国家权力运行结构中,民主集中制、议行关系、合宪性审查三者之间相互依存、环环相扣。合宪性审查制度应以维系议行关系的平衡为功能定向,围绕效率与约束的双重目标,在政治层面和法律层面发挥双重功能。政治性的合宪性审查主要从党政关系、权力结构和民主运行的角度进行,规范和保障人民民主的实现;法律性的合宪性审查,主要涉及法院在审理个案遇到合宪性疑问时应如何处理的问题。合宪性审查的政治功能决定了,法律性的合宪性审查应改变当前多元多轨的立法审查现状,转向全国人大及其常委会与最高人民法院相衔接的二元双轨机制。
As a fundamental constitutional system, constitutional review is not only a legal arrangement but also a political one, with both legal and political functions. China needs to develop a unique constitutional review system on the basis of its own political structure and state power operation system. The 1982 Constitution has established a state power operation structure in which democratic centralism, relationships between deliberative and executive powers, and constitutional review inter-depend on and interact with each other. The constitutional review system should take the maintenance of the balance between deliberative and executive powers as its functional orientation, focus on the dual objectives of efficiency and restraint, and play dual functions at both the political and the legal levels. Constitutional review at the political level should mainly be aimed at standardizing and guaranteeing the realization of democracy from the perspective of Party-government relationship, power structure and democratic operation. Constitutional review at the legal level should mainly be carried out by considering how courts deal with constitutional questions in the trial of individual cases. The political function of constitutional review determines that the legal constitutional review should be changed from the current multi-track legislative review regime to a dual-track mechanism with a linkage between the National People’s Congress(and its Standing Committee) and the Supreme People’s Court.
出处
《法学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期3-17,共15页
Chinese Journal of Law
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“‘社会主义公共财产’的宪法释义”(17AFX009)的阶段性成果
关键词
议行关系
议行合一
功能适当
民主集中制
合宪性审查
relationship between deliberative and executive powers
integration of deliberative and executive powers
functional appropriateness
democratic centralism
constitutional review