摘要
本文以平台和参与者(雇主和服务商)组成的网络众包系统为研究对象,基于微分博弈理论构建了众包交易过程中平台的违约监管行为和参与者的违约控制行为的博弈模型,研究了双方在独立决策情形、平台激励下的Stackelberg博弈情形和双方一致决策情形下的不同博弈策略.研究表明,当满足一定条件时,从众包平台和参与者的独立决策情形到众包平台激励下的Stackelberg博弈情形,再到双方一致决策情形,平台和参与者的收益以及众包系统的总体收益都呈增加趋势.众包平台可以通过设计激励机制和监管机制影响双方收益率来降低参与者的违约风险,合理选择最优的策略行为,实现帕累托改进.另外,本文基于猪八戒等网络众包平台的调查分析进行了参数设置,通过数值分析验证了所构建的理论模型.
This paper focuses on the crowdsourcing system consisting of platform and participants,and constructs a model about supervising behavior of the platform and default behavior of the participants in crowdsourcing process based on differential game theory.We explore the different game strategies under independent decision-making,Stackelberg game with platform and the cooperative decision-making situations.The findings are the return of platform and participants as well as the overall return of crowdsourcing system increases from independent decision making to the Stackelberg game with platform incentive,and then to the cooperative decision-making situations.The crowdsourcing platform can reduce the participants’default risk by the incentive mechanism and affect the return rate of both parties by the regulatory mechanism,so as to select the optimal strategic behavior reasonably and achieve the Pareto improvement.In addition,we set the model parameter based on Zhubajie crowdsourcing platform as case,and do a numerical analysis to validate the theoretical model.
作者
刘伟
丁凯文
刘德海
LIU Wei;DING Kaiwen;LIU Dehai(School of Management Science&Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第10期2559-2568,共10页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
教育部人文社科基金项目(17YJA630059)
辽宁省教育厅科学研究项目(LN2016YB006)
东北财经大学校级科研项目(DUFE2017Y04)
辽宁省高等学校创新人才支持计划项目(81)~~
关键词
网络众包
违约风险
微分博弈
crowdsourcing
default risk
differential game
