摘要
在聚焦审计师具有的各级人大代表、政协委员和党代表三类政治身份的基础上,利用2006-2017年上市公司数据研究发现,审计师政治身份能显著提升审计收费水平。进一步研究显示,审计师政治身份数量越多、层级越高,经其审计的会计信息质量就越高,盈余反应系数越大,被审计客户违规概率越低。这表明,政治身份昭示着审计师的职业声誉,并未成为寻租工具。
This article focuses on auditors’ three types of political identities including NPC deputies,CPPCC members and party representatives at all levels. We utilized the data covering all mainboard nonfinancial listed companies from 2006 to 2017,and found that the auditors who had political identities would significantly charge higher audit fee. Furthermore,the paper shows that,when auditors have higher-level or more political identities,their auditee will have higher-quality accounting information,greater earnings response coefficient and lower probability of violations. It can be concluded that,auditors’ politica identities have reflected their professional reputation,but not evolved into rent-seeking tool.
作者
王瑜
唐雪松
孙芳城
WANG Yu;TANG Xue-song;SUN Fang-cheng(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871;School of Accounting,Southwestern university of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130;Center for China's Governmental Auditing Research,Chengdu 611130;School of Accounting,ChongQing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第12期107-122,共16页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71672152)
国家社科基金西部项目(17XJY007)
重庆市社会科学规划博士项目(2015BS031)
重庆市高等教育教学改革研究项目(193139)
西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK1307068)
关键词
审计师政治身份
声誉昭示
寻租工具
会计信息质量
盈余反应系数
auditor political identity
reputation signal
rent-seeking tool
accounting information quality
earnings response coefficient
