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网络博弈合作剩余收益分配的协商方法 被引量:6

A bargaining method for cooperative surplus income allocation in network game
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摘要 参与者在进行网络博弈时有机会与其相邻参与者签署协议进行合作,此时参与者之间的博弈关系构成了一个网络结构,并可以使用无向图来表示.参与者之间依据网络结构选择合作对象进行合作,进而产生剩余收益,而剩余收益通过协商的方式在两个参与者之间进行分配.本文依据协商理论与匹配理论,研究网络博弈环境下参与者之间如何签署协议进行合作,进而分配合作产生的剩余收益的问题,称为网络协商博弈,并给出基本的可行解的形式.通过限制参与者可以签署协议的数量,本文对网络协商博弈进行分类,使用协商与匹配方法研究每一类网络协商博弈的合理解的具体形式并设计求解方法.本文的结果表明:参与者之间的合作以及合作收益的分配不仅与网络博弈自身有关,而且与参与者能够签署的合作协议数量有关.研究拓展了协商方法在网络协商问题中的应用,为多边合作对象的选择以及合作剩余收益的分配提供了参考. Participants have the opportunity to enter into agreements with their neighboring participants to cooperate in network game.At this point,the game relationship between the participants constitutes a network structure,and can be represented by an undirected graph.Participants can cooperate between their neighboring participants according to the network structure and distribute surplus income between two participants through bargaining.Based on the bargaining theory and matching theory,this paper studies how to sign agreements to cooperate among participants in the network game environment,and analyzes how to allocate the benefit of surplus income through bargaining,which is called the network bargaining game,and find the form of the basic feasible solution.By limiting the number of agreements that participants can sign,this paper classifies the network bargaining game,and uses the bargaining and matching methods to study the specific forms of reasonable solutions for each type of network bargaining games.The results of this paper show that the cooperation of participants and the distribution of the benefits of cooperation are not only related to the network game itself,but also related to the number of cooperation agreements that participants can sign.The research expands the application of bargaining method for network bargaining game,and provides decision-making references for multilateral cooperation among participants.
作者 刘佳 王先甲 LIU Jia;WANG Xianjia(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;Institute of Systems Engineering,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
出处 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第11期2760-2770,共11页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金 国家自然科学基金(71871171,71871173)~~
关键词 博弈论 网络博弈 协商 匹配 game theory network game bargaining matching
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