摘要
财政补贴是产业政策“工具箱”里的重要组成部分,既有研究大多认为中国财政补贴效率较低,但是补贴规模却在快速上升。本文尝试从企业缴税与财政补贴“列收列支”的角度揭开这一谜题,发现这种“虚增”的财政补贴同时导致规模扩大和效率低下。基于2008—2011年全国税收调查的微观企业数据,本文从多个维度构建税收超收指标后发现,税收超收与财政补贴之间存在明显的“列收列支”关系,政府对企业的税收超收显著提高了企业下一期获得的财政补贴;“列收列支”与地方政府激励正相关,即相对征税压力越大的地区,政府对企业税收超收再以财政补贴返还的效应越明显;“列收列支”还与地方政府动员能力相关,地方税务局管辖企业、国有企业和现金流充裕企业配合税收超收的积极性更高;“列收列支”导致财政补贴的绩效被低估,扣除超收税后财政补贴对企业全要素生产率的提升作用明显增强。本文结论对理解屡禁不止的“过头税”以及中国财政补贴的真实性具有重要意义,同时意味着现有关于补贴效率的文献研究存在严重的低估。
Governmental subsidy is an important part of industrial policy“toolbox”.Existing research mostly believe that the efficiency of China’s fiscal subsidies is low.This paper finds that the scale of China’s fiscal subsidies is rising rapidly while it is operating at a low efficiency,and for the first time,this article attempts to unravel this puzzle from the perspective of the“revenue and expenditure linkages”between government subsidies and taxes,we find that this“inflated”subsidy leads to both scale expansion and inefficiency.Based on the micro-enterprise data of the national tax survey database from 2008 to 2011,this paper constructs the indicators of tax over-collection from multiple dimensions and finds that there is an obvious relationship between tax over-collection and fiscal subsidies,and the government’s tax over-collection on enterprises significantly increased the fiscal subsidies enterprises would receive in the next year.“Revenue and expenditure linkages”are positively related to government incentives.In areas with higher taxation pressures,the government manipulates tax revenues and returns them with subsidies.The effect is more obvious.The“revenue and expenditure linkage”is also significantly related to the local mobilization ability.The more government assistance,the more cash flow,the enterprises under the jurisdiction of the local tax bureau and state-owned enterprises,the higher the enthusiasm for over-tax revenue.“Revenue of income and expenditure”leading to the performance of fiscal subsidies is significantly underestimated,and the role of fiscal subsidies in improving TFP is significantly enhanced after deducting the tax.The conclusions of this paper are of great significance for understanding the“excessive tax”of repeated prohibitions and the authenticity of China’s subsidies.At the same time,it means carefully interpreting existing research conclusions about inefficient subsidies.
作者
范子英
王倩
FAN Zi-ying;WANG Qian(School of Public Economics and Administration SUFE,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第12期23-41,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“全面推进生态创新的财税政策体系研究”（批准号19ZDA076）
国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国财政补贴的规模测度、形成机制与溢出效应研究”（批准号71973088）
国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于DMSP/OLS数据的政治关联对经济增长的影响研究”（批准号71573165）
关键词
税收超收
财政补贴
征税压力
tax over-collect
subsidies
taxation pressure
