摘要
提出了一种带有保留价及新的反比佣金率c=(1/k)b(k为佣金率系数,b为成交价)的拍卖模型,这种反比佣金率更加符合实际。首先计算出第一价格拍卖和第二价格拍卖中投标者的均衡投标策略,然后计算出两种拍卖模式中拍卖参与各方的预期收益。结果表明,一级价格密闭式拍卖中投标者的均衡报价关于保留价及佣金率系数均递增,而二级价格密闭式拍卖中投标者的均衡报价关于佣金率系数递增、关于保留价递减。
In real auctions,apart from the seller and buyer,there is always another player—auction house,which earns commissions.This paper reports a sealed-bid auction model with a reserve price r and a new inverse commission rate c=(1/k)b which can better reflect the actual auction situation.First,we find the equilibrium bidding strategy for both first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions,and then obtain the expected revenue of the bidder,seller and the auction house.The results indicate that the equilibrium bidding strategy has a positive correlation with both r and k in a first-price sealed-bid auction,whereas it has a positive correlation with k but a negative correlation with r in a second-price sealed-bid auction.
作者
杨卫星
程禹铭
YANG WeiXing;CHENG YuMing(College of Mathematics and Physics,Beijing University of Chemical Technology,Beijing 100029,China)
出处
《北京化工大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第1期118-123,共6页
Journal of Beijing University of Chemical Technology(Natural Science Edition)
关键词
反比佣金率
保留价
预期收益
inverse commission rate
reserve price
expected revenue
