摘要
科层组织任务间竞争关系是国家治理结构失衡背后的科学问题。基于中国城市“逢雨必涝”的现象,从组织注意力分配的角度,对287个地级以上城市1999—2010年市政路桥和排水支出“上下”竞争的实证研究表明,中国科层组织绩效易测任务对不易测任务的争夺是权威体制下强激励效应扩张的结果。首先,权威体制背景下,强激励通过相对绩效和短期政绩信号两个机制塑造了这一竞争关系。其次,除了直接效应外,强激励还存在扩张效应——既构成(沟通系统集权化改革、本领域及其他领域组织任务注意力争夺等)强化这一争夺的因素起作用的前提,也造成了(监督方行政控制、代理方机构设置及外部事件央媒问责等)防止这一争夺的因素的失效。这一发现对现有组织理论及国家治理结构调整实践均有重要参考价值。
The competition between bureaucratic tasks leads to an imbalance in the state's governance structure.Based on the phenomenon of urban waterlogging from the perspective of organizational attention allocation,this empirical research examined the competition between expenditures foraboveground and underground municipal facilities in 287 prefecture-level cities.The evidence shows that the competition between Chinese bureaucratic organization tasks with easy-to-measure performance and tasks whose performance are not easily measured was the result of the expansion of high-powered incentives.In the context of authoritarian systems,a high-powered incentive shapesa competitive relationship through two mechanisms:relative performance and short-term performance signals.It also has an expansion effect.First,high-powered incentives are the basis for the factors that strengthen the competition to work,such as the centralization reform of the communication system,the competition among other tasks for attention in the same field,and the competition among other tasks for attention in other fields.Second,high-powered incentives also cause the invalidation of the factors that prevent this competition,such as the administrative control of the supervisory party,the institutional setup of the agency,and the accountability of external media.This finding has important implications for organizational theory and the practices of adjusting national governance structures.
出处
《公共行政评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期43-62,196,197,共22页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
华侨大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目“地方政府环保和经济任务间竞争程度及其治理工具研究”(19SKGC-QG01)
关键词
科层组织
组织任务间竞争
组织注意力分配
绩效可测性
强激励效应扩张
Bureaucracy
Competition Relationship Between Organization Tasks
Organizational Attention Allocation
Performance Measurement
Expansion of the Effect of High-Powered Incentives
