摘要
当强势供应商同时销售滞销品和杨销品时,通过分析其捆綁销售策略与单独销售策略,探讨了捆綁销售策略对供应链带来的双重影响.结果表明,强势供应商的捆綁销售策略确实能提高滞销品销售量,但也会形成两类新的冲突.一是利润冲突,供应商捆綁销售降低了零售商尤其是供应商自身的利润,不利于整个供应链发展;二是订货量冲突,供应商捆綁销售在提高滞销品订货量的同时降低了畅销品的订货量.建议供应商在捆綁销售的同时进行促销努力以缓解两类冲突,使扭曲的捆綁型供应链得到协调.
When a strong supplier sells both unsalable goods and best selling goods,the influences of the vendor's bundling strategy on the supply chain arc discussed by comparing the pure components strategy with pure bundling strategy.Results show that a strong supplier’s bundling strategy certainly improves the sales volume of unsalable products but also leads to two new conflicts.The first is profit conflict,the supplier’s profits especially the retailer's profits will both be lower under pure bundling,so that bundling is unfavorable to the entire supply chain.The second is order quantity conflict,although the order quantity of unsalable goods has improved,the order quantity of best-selling product will be reduced.It is recommended that the supplier bundle sales at the same time promotional efforts are made to mitigate the two types of conflict and to harmonize the twisted bundled type supply chain.
作者
刘卫华
于辉
Liu Weihua;Yu Hui(School of Economics and Business Administration.Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第6期820-830,共11页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571024,71872021)
教育部人文社会科学研宂规划基金资助项目(14YJA630087,15YJA630058).
关键词
滞销品
畅销品
捆绑销售
供应链冲突
unsalable goods
best selling goods
pure bundling
supply chain conflict
