摘要
宅基地转变为城市建设用地后会出现大幅增值,在征收、置换过程中农民和地方政府会为争夺土地增值展开激烈的博弈。采用博弈模型分析政府与农户在互不知晓对方惩罚与抵制信息的情况下,博弈双方的策略选择及相关影响。研究表明:在不掌握地方政府惩罚能力高低的完全信息的情况下,农户并不会选择平均出价作为最优策略。无论地方政府惩罚能力高低,农户都按照面对惩罚能力低的政府时选择单一出价的策略;惩罚能力高的地方政府可以通过选择强拆信号的强度来阻止惩罚能力低的地方政府模仿其行为,进而使得分离均衡能够存在;地方政府和农户采取的策略以及分离均衡的存在,也从一个角度解释了为什么中央政府一再强调不能实行强拆、而强拆却屡禁不止。博弈引发的成本都是社会资源浪费,产生的根源是地方政府拥有农村宅基地的垄断征收权。
When the rural residential land is transformed into urban construction land,there will be a large increase in value.In the process of expropriation and replacement,peasantry and local governments will start a fierce game for the increase in value of land.In this paper,the intensity of local government punishment,information and signal transmission are introduced into the game model to analyze the strategy selection and related impact of both sides of the game when the peasantry lack the information of the cost of local government punishment and the intensity of peasantry resistance to expropriation.The results show that under the condition that the peasantry lack complete information about the punishment ability of local governments,the average bidding is not the optimal strategy choice for them,but the single bidding strategy adopted by local governments in the face of the government with low punishment ability regardless of the type of local government;the local governments with high punishment ability can prevent the local governments with low punishment ability by selecting the intensity of forced demolition signal The government imitates its behavior,so that the separation equilibrium can exist;because of the strategies adopted by local governments and farmers and the existence of separation equilibrium,it also explains why the central government has repeatedly forbidden but could not stop forced demolition;the cost caused by the game is a waste of social resources,the root of which is that the local government owns the monopoly right of expropriation rural residential land.
作者
孙秋鹏
SUN Qiu-peng(Theoretical Innovation Base of Academy of Marxism&Hainan Tropical Ocean University,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)
出处
《北京社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期102-116,共15页
Social Sciences of Beijing
基金
北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心项目(中国政法大学)阶段性成果
关键词
宅基地
土地征收
信号传递
地方政府
农户
rural residential land
land expropriation
signal transmission
local government
peasantry
