摘要
考虑到旅行社在我国邮轮旅游销售供应链中的重要性,邮轮港口所在地政府为推进邮轮旅游产业发展,普遍对旅行社实施两种激励政策——组织游客奖励与营销推广扶持。但两类激励政策对当地政府、邮轮公司及旅行社的效益影响尚不明确。本文首先建立“政府-邮轮公司-旅行社”三阶段主从博弈模型,以研究两种激励政策对两企业运营决策的作用机理,并给出政府在最大化市场需求目标下的最优激励政策。其次,借助数值仿真实验分析了不同情形下基于最优激励政策时市场需求和企业利润的变化。结果表明:站在政府角度,激励政策有两种选择——仅采取营销推广激励或者两种激励方式并存,而且最优激励设计受到补贴预算、旅行社营销推广能力及其岸上游收益的影响。站在旅行社角度,作为激励政策的直接受益方,其定价与营销努力决策会受到两类激励方式的不同影响;而对于营销推广能力较强的旅行社,可以依赖于政府奖励适当提高船票价格,以改善当前国内邮轮市场的低价竞争。站在邮轮公司角度,即使自身没有直接得到激励资金,其仍能间接获得激励政策所带来的红利。研究结论可为政府的邮轮旅游激励政策的设计提供理论参考,并为邮轮公司与旅行社在面对政府财政干预时提供决策建议。
To boost regional cruise economy,local governments of many coastal cities in China have launched incentive schemes for travel agencies which play critical roles in the cruise tourism supply chain under the merchant model of“charter ships”.The two commonly observed schemes are the tourists organized-based incentives scheme which aims to reward the travel agencies according to the number of organized cruisers,and the promotion effort-based incentives plan which targets at reducing the input promoting costs of travel agencies.However,the implications of these types of incentives for local governments,cruise companies,as well as travel agencies remain unclear.This paper developed a three-stage game-theoretic framework to capture the underlying strategic interactions among the three parties:the government,cruise companies,and travel agencies in order to have a deep understanding of designing the optimal subsidy policy for the local government that aims to increase their market shares.The results reveal that,from government perspective,the optimality of subsidy policies under different market scenarios depends on the budget,the extra on-shore revenue,and the promoting cost rate of travel agencies.For travel agencies,the intended beneficiaries,both pricing and promotion effort strategies are affected by the two incentive schemes in different ways.In addition,the travel agencies with strong marketing capabilities can raise ticket price through the support of government incentives,which is conducive to break the fierce price competition in the Chinese cruise market;from the cruise company perspective,the profit-maximizing cruise companies can transfer the benefits generated by incentive schemes into themselves even when the incentives are not offered directly to them.The authors believe that this analysis also sheds light on some managerial issues,which will not only help policy makers to design incentive policies for places with an emerging cruise industry,but assist enterprises along the cruise supply chain to optimize their decision-making processes in responding to the external financial incentives.
作者
徐成元
王磊
XU Chengyuan;WANG Lei(Business School,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China;Shanghai Institute of Tourism,Shanghai 200234,China;Tourism School,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China)
出处
《旅游科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期71-87,共17页
Tourism Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“供应链成员的动态公平Stackelberg-Nash均衡策略研究”(71771129)
青岛市博士后应用研究项目“互联网时代服务搭便车与零售商的决策优化研究”(2015173)
山东省博士后创新项目“网络环境下服务搭便车与供应链的竞争与协调策略研究”(201603064)。
关键词
邮轮供应链
政府激励
邮轮市场渗透
邮轮公司
旅行社
cruise supply chain
government incentives
cruise market penetration
cruise company
travel agency
