摘要
为研究政府组合政策对于绿色创新能力不同的寡头企业生产策略的影响,构建演化博弈模型,在环境税税率和创新补贴额度不同的情境下,通过数值仿真模拟企业生产决策的动态选择过程。研究表明:高强度环境税制和高额的创新补贴极大地激励了两寡头企业绿色创新。环境税一定时,补贴值到一定额度,创新能力强的企业率先选择生产绿色产品,进一步提高时,创新能力弱的企业也将选择绿色生产。当环境税税率和补贴都比较低时,两类企业均选择生产普通产品,政府的宽松管控,低额补贴无法激起企业的绿色创新积极性。生产绿色产品的单位成本增额越高,或者消费者对于绿色产品的消费意愿不足时,需要政府的补贴力度越大。
In order to study the influence of government combined policy on the production strategy of duopoly enterprises with different green innovation capabilities,an evolutionary game model is constructed.Under the circumstances of different environmental tax rates and innovation subsidies,numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic selection process of enterprise production decisions.Research shows that the high-intensity environmental tax system and high-value innovation subsidies greatly stimulate the green innovation of the duopoly enterprises.When the environmental tax is fixed,the subsidy value will reach a certain amount,and enterprises with strong innovation ability will take the lead in selecting green products.When further improvement,enterprises with weak innovation ability will also choose green production.When the environmental tax rate and subsidies are relatively low,both types of enterprises choose to produce ordinary products.The government’s lose control and low subsidies cannot stimulate the green innovation enthusiasm of enterprises.The higher the unit cost increase for producing green products,or the greater the consumer’s willingness to consume green products,the greater the subsidy should be required by the government.
作者
孙振清
蔡琳琳
葛馨童
SUN Zhenqing;CAI Linlin;GE Xintong(College of Economics and Management,Tianjin University of Science&Technology,Tianjin 300222,China)
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2020年第5期57-64,共8页
Ecological Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目资助“优化开发区域率先实现碳排放峰值目标路径研究”(16AGL002)
教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目资助“可持续发展中的绿色设计研究”(16JZD014)
天津市高等学校创新团队培养计划“绿色发展理念与创新产品设计”(TD13-5012)。
关键词
双寡头企业
环境税
绿色创新补贴
演化博弈
仿真
duopoly enterprises
environmental tax
green innovation subsidy
evolutionary game
simulation
