摘要
为有效缓解水源地的生态环保压力,政府有必要对其进行生态补偿。为提高生态补偿效率、保障资金的有效配置,有必要建立补偿的申报制度。文章通过构建信号博弈模型,对生态补偿中政府与水源地双方的策略选择进行分析,探讨水源地骗取补偿金的行为机理,并指出影响均衡的主要因素。结果表明:受信息不对称的影响,该博弈中存在分离均衡和混同均衡两类均衡状态,信号的真伪主要体现在敷衍保护的水源地上。政府对水源地的后验概率、核查强度、惩罚力度与补偿金额是影响市场均衡效率的关键因素。应通过增大水源地的伪装保护难度、与政绩等结合加大惩罚力度、强化核查等措施,引导该博弈由混同均衡向分离均衡演变,实现水源地生态的持续改善。
In order to effectively alleviate the pressure of ecological and environmental protection,it is necessary for the government to make ecological compensation,and it is necessary to establish a compensation declaration system so as to improve the efficiency of ecological compensation and ensure the effective allocation of funds. Through constructing the signal game model,this paper analyzes the strategic choice of both the government and the water source area in ecological compensation, explores the behavior mechanism of the water source area cheating compensation,and points out the main factors affecting the balance. The results show that under the influence of information asymmetry,two kinds of equilibrium states exist in the game,i. e,separation equilibrium and mixture equilibrium,and that the authenticity or falsity of signal is mainly reflected in the perfunctorily protected water source area. Government’s posttest probability,inspection intensity,punishment intensity and compensation amount for water source area are the key factors affecting the efficiency of market equilibrium. Therefore,it is necessary to increase the difficulty of camouflage protection,increase punishment intensity with reference to the achievements,strengthen the verification and other measures,guide the evolution of the game from mixed equilibrium to separation equilibrium,and achieve the sustainable improvement of water source ecology.
作者
耿翔燕
GENG Xiangyan(School of Economics,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China)
出处
《山东财经大学学报》
2020年第3期101-110,共10页
Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“水源地保护区生态补偿制度建设与配套政策研究”(14BJY027)
国家社会科学基金项目“主体功能区视角下的流域生态补偿机制研究”(16BJY03)
山东省社会科学规划研究项目“山东省水污染防治中流域生态补偿制度创新研究”(19CDCJ08)。
关键词
水源地
信号博弈
生态补偿
信息不对称
water source area
signal game
ecological compensation
information asymmetry
