摘要
本文运用实证分析方法对1921年公债整理的原因、内在机理和意义进行重新探讨,认为其根本原因是中央政权的下移与财权的向虚,而诱因则为亟待修复信用失范的公债制度。公债整理实为政府和银行重建以信用为基础的公债运行机制的过程,通过构建纳什谈判博弈模型,表明此次公债整理办法是帕累托有效的。在新的公债偿借体系下,通过引进独立第三方机构——总税务司,旧债偿还得以保证,新债发行得以有效约束,从而维持了北洋政府后期的公债信用。
This paper uses empirical analysis method to re-explore the reasons,internal mechanism and significance of the 1921 bond arrangement.The fundamental reasons for the 1921 government bond arrangement were the downward shift of the central government and the weakening of financial power,while the incentive reason was the urgent need to repair the credit anomie of the government bond system.The bond arrangement is the process of government and bank rebuilding the operation mechanism of bond system based on credit.By constructing Nash negotiation game model,we can see that the result of the bond arrangement is Pareto effective.Under the new bond repayment system,through introducing an independent third-party organization——the General Tax Department,the repayment of outstanding debt can be guaranteed,and the issuance of new bonds can be effectively restrained,thus maintaining the creditworthiness of the later period of the Northern Warlords government.
作者
周莹
兰日旭
Zhou Ying;Lan Rixu
出处
《中国经济史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期58-77,共20页
Researches in Chinese Economic History
基金
国家社科基金重大项目“近代中国金融市场发展与运行研究”(批准号:16ZDA133)的阶段性成果之一。
关键词
公债整理
纳什谈判模型
公债偿借机制
Bond Arrangement
Nash Negotiation Game Model
Operation Mechanism of Bond System
