摘要
在国企的市场化改革进程中,高管薪酬问题始终受到广泛关注。以美国为参照,中国国企的高管薪酬分别在"制定"和"规制"方面,呈现"董事会俘获"和"侧重实质公平"的特征。受此两项特征的影响,在过去四十余年的实践过程中,国企高管薪酬在一般性的不公平和无效率之外,呈现出更加复杂多样的特殊问题表现。既存的法律规制试图通过"实质公平"和"程序正义"作出回应,但这些规制手段,或由于自身设计存在缺陷,或对本土问题缺乏回应,并未完全实现预期目标,反而带来了预想不到的副作用。未来国企高管薪酬的法律规制,必须同时完成包括"思维转换""侧重转移""结构优化"在内的系统性调整,方能助力国企深化改革。
During the marketization of Chinese SOEs,the executive compensation problem has attracted extensive attention.Compared with the U.S,the formulation and regulation of SOE’s executive compensation present specific characteristics,such as the board capture and focusing on intrinsic fairness.Under the influence of these characteristics,SOE’s executive compensation has more problems other than unfairness and inefficiency over the past 40 years.Legal regulations were adopted to resolve these problems by emphasizing on intrinsic fairness and due process.However,because of the flawed design and lacking of responses to local problems,these regulations brought about side effects instead of solutions.Proper regulations should not only change the way of thinking and regulative emphasis,but also pay more attention to improve the structure of executive compensation.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期2-11,共10页
Securities Market Herald
基金
2019年度司法部国家法治与法学理论研究项目“公司股利分配法律制度研究”(19SFB3032)的研究成果。
