摘要
考虑政府奖惩机制,在制造商依赖零售商回收的闭环供应链中,当零售商的回收成本信息是不对称时,为探究制造商最优激励合同设计问题,本文构建制造商与零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过运用委托代理理论和显示原理求得实现对零售商信息甄别的最优两部定价合同菜单,并分析该合同菜单性质以及信息不对称的影响,最后探讨政府奖惩机制对均衡结果的影响。研究发现,随着零售商回收效率降低,制造商会提高批发价、减少转移支付。回收成本信息不对称会使制造商和供应链利润减少,零售商利润增加。政府奖惩机制的出台会使制造商降低批发价、提高转移支付。当政府的回收标准较高而奖惩力度较小时,奖惩机制的出台会使供应链利润减少,否则,会使供应链利润增加。
In order to develop recycling economy and realize sustainable development of human society,many countries have issued recycling regulations with the nature of reward and punishment.Under the regulations of reward-penalty,more and more manufacturers begin to recycle their waste products through retailers and then remanufacture them.However,the retailer’s information of recycling cost is private and cannot be observed by the manufacturers accurately,which will reduce the performance of recycling operations and supply chain.Hence,in order to solve this problem,incentives contracts are designed by using information-screening model.In detail,the following questions are investigated:How to design the information screening contracts of the manufacturer?Whether is it necessary for the manufacturer to provide information-screening contracts to the retailers of all cost types?What are the characteristics of the information-screening contracts and the impact of information asymmetry?What are the impacts of mechanism of reward-penalty on the information-screening contracts and other equilibria results?A Stackelberg model between the manufacturer and the retailer is constructed.The manufacturer first provides a two-part contract menu to the retailer.Second,the retailer declares its cost type base its true cost information,and then decides sale price and collect rate.The model is solved by the methods of standard backward induction,i.e.,first the retailer’s optimal decisions are solved and then the manufacturer’s optimization problem is solved,which includes the incentive compatible constraint and the individual rational constraint.Through using the principal-agent theory,revelation principle and optimal control theory,the optimal two-part contract menu and other equilibrium outcomes are derived.Based on these results,other questions are further investigated by comparison analyses and sensitivity analyses.The results show that as the retailer’s collection efficiency decreases,the manufacturer increases the whole price and decreases the transfer payment.The profits of the manufacturer and the supply chain decrease and the profit of the retailer increases due to the asymmetric information of collection cost.Moreover,the execution of the reward-penalty mechanism induces the manufacturer to decrease the whole price and to increase the transfer payment.Furthermore,when the government’s requirement of collection is high and the level of reward-penalty is low,the execution of the reward-penalty mechanism decreases the supply chain’s profit;otherwise,the supply chain’s profit increases.
作者
张盼
余莉婷
熊中楷
ZHANG Pan;YU Li-ting;XIONG Zhong-kai(Research Center of the Central China for Economic and Social Development,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China;School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第5期89-100,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71961019)
江西省社会科学规划项目(18GL33)。
关键词
闭环供应链
奖惩机制
信息不对称
合同设计
closed-loop supply chain
mechanism of reward-penalty
information asymmetry
contract designing
