摘要
本文在委托代理理论框架下,全面分析了数字营销效果造假现象:其本质是数字营销组织在签约后代理运作中基于侥幸心理而产生的提高数字营销效果数据,进而实现自身利益极大化时损害广告主利益的道德风险,其成因是广告主与数字营销组织间的信息不对称与契约缺陷,其危害是不仅影响广告主利益,而且影响广告业健康发展.并结合数字营销情境,提出了不同于目前消解信息不对称的新治理对策:设计最优契约.
Under the framework of the principal-agent theory,this thesis comprehensively analyzes the phenomenon of digital marketing effectiveness fraud.Its essence is the moral hazard that digital marketing organizations improve luckily the data of digital marketing effectiveness,which can damage the interests of an advertiser while maximizing their own interests which caused by information asymmetry and the contract defects between an advertiser and digital marketing organizations lead to this phenomenon.It harms not only the interests of advertisers,but also the robustly development of the advertising industry.Combined with the situation of digital marketing,this thesis proposes a new governance countermeasure to design the optimal contract,which is different from the current way of eliminating information asymmetry.
作者
柳庆勇
Liu Qingyong(Three Gorges University)
出处
《新闻与传播评论》
CSSCI
2020年第4期111-119,共9页
Journalism & Communication Review
基金
湖北省普通高校人文社科重点研究基地(影视文化与产业发展研究中心)开放基金项目(YSKF1809)。
关键词
数字营销效果造假
委托代理
最优契约
the digital marketing effectiveness fraud
principal-agent
optimal contract
