摘要
近年港口环境污染日益严重,港口企业作为港口供应链上的核心企业,在推动绿色港口建设上具有重要作用.在强制减排的基础上,将经济绩效与环境绩效考虑在内,构建了地方政府与港口企业的减排演化博弈模型.模型中引入碳税作为惩罚因子,同时考虑政府的监管成本与企业寻租成本,通过对不同均衡状态进行分析,讨论政府监管与惩罚对双方策略的影响.结果表明:政府不完全监管而港口企业减排为最优纳什均衡策略,政府可以通过调节监管力度与单位碳税之间的关系来决定是否采取完全监管,从而影响港口企业的减排决策.一定程度上,这将为今后推动绿色港口的建设提供有效参考.
In recent years,port environmental pollution has become increasingly serious.As a core enterprise in the port supply chain,port enterprises play an important role in promoting the construction of green harbors.Based on mandatory emission reductions,economic performance and environmental performance have been taken into account to build an evolutionary game model of a local government with port companies’emission reductions.The model introduces carbon tax as a penalty factor and considers the government’s regulatory costs and corporate rent-seeking costs.By analyzing different equilibrium states,the effects of government regulation and punishment on both parties’strategies were discussed.The results show that the optimal Nash equilibrium strategy is the government does not fully supervise and port companies reduce emissions.The government can decide whether to adopt full supervision by adjusting the relationship between the intensity of supervision and the unit carbon tax,which will affect the decision of port enterprises to reduce emissions.To a certain extent,it provides an effective reference for promoting the construction of green ports in the future.
作者
徐艳
孟燕萍
XU Yan;MENG Yanping(Institute of Logistics Management Science and Engineering, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China;International Business School, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China)
基金
国家社科基金一般项目(18BGL103)
上海市社科基金面上项目(2017BGL015)资助.
关键词
强制减排
绿色港口
演化博弈
监管成本
企业寻租
compulsory emission reduction
green port
evolution game
regulatory cost
enterprise rent-seeking
