摘要
我国以置换为目的发行的地方债包括公开发行和定向承销两种发债方式。与公开发行相比,定向承销的地方债“发行利率异象”明显改善。基于搭售合约范式,提供了一个关于经济互惠和行政干预两大视角的微观阐释,并以我国2015—2018年发行的地方政府置换债券为样本,对理论假说进行实证检验,研究发现:第一,经济互惠效应受发行方式影响。定向承销缓解了经济互惠效应对地方债发行利率的抑制作用,公开发行则促进了经济互惠效应对地方债发行利率的抑制作用。第二,行政干预效应受发行方式影响。定向承销缓解了行政干预效应对地方债发行利率的抑制作用,公开发行则促进了行政干预效应对地方债发行利率的抑制作用。
The local government bonds issued for the purpose of replacement in China include public issuance and targeted underwriting.Compared with the public issuance,the"issuing interest rate anomaly"of targeted underwriting of local government bonds has improved significantly.Therefore,based on the model of tying contract,this paper provides a micro interpretation of two perspectives of economic reciprocity and administrative intervention,and empirically tests the theoretical hypothesis with the sample of local government replacement bonds issued in 2015-2018.The research finds that:Firstly,economic reciprocity effect is affected by the way of issuance.Targeted underwriting alleviates the inhibition of economic reciprocity on the interest rate of local government bond issuance,while public issuance promotes the inhibition of economic reciprocity on the interest rate of local government bond issuance.Secondly,the effect of administrative intervention is affected by the way of issuance.Targeted underwriting alleviates the inhibition of administrative intervention on the interest rate of local government bond issuance,while public issuance promotes the inhibition of administrative intervention on the interest rate of local government bond issuance.
作者
王剑锋
吴京
陈玉洁
Wang Jianfeng;Wu Jing;Chen Yujie(School of Finance,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China)
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期45-55,共11页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
基金
对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金“地方债搭售合约与发行利率异象”(19YB07)。
关键词
搭售合约
经济互惠
行政干预
定向承销
公开发行
tying contract
economic reciprocity
administrative intervention
targeted underwriting
public issuance
