摘要
本文以券商因违规而被中国证券监督管理委员会(以下简称证监会)处罚的外生冲击事件作为财务顾问声誉受损的度量指标,考察券商声誉对于并购绩效的影响,进而分析证监会对券商的处罚是否能实现全链条监管政策效应。本文发现券商受罚后会在短期内对并购绩效产生负面影响,降低并购估值,并延长并购审批完成时间。券商声誉受损会通过内在业务能力机制和外在投资者关注机制溢出到并购市场中。券商声誉价值主要来自券商能够获得政治资源,而非并购经验丰富或者对并购公司更熟悉。本文证明证监会对券商的处罚性监管是有效的。在政策建议上,监管部门应加强对券商业务的监管和规范,激励金融中介对声誉价值的重视,进而间接规范并购市场,实现证券市场有效治理,促进企业高质量发展。
This paper uses the punishment of securities companies by China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)as an exogenous shock to measure the reputation damage of financial consultants.We test the influence of the reputation of securities companies on the performance of M&A and analyze whether the CSRC’s punishment can achieve the objective of full-chain regulation.The results show that the penalty of financial advisors has a significant negative short-term impact on the performance of M&A projects,including reducing the incremental wealth and prolonging the total completion time.The reputation damage influences M&A performance through both internal and external mechanisms.The reputation value of securities companies mainly comes from the political resources of securities companies,rather than the experience of M&A or the familiarity with M&A companies.This paper also confirms the effectiveness of the supervisory action taken by CSRC.Therefore,the regulatory authorities should strengthen the supervision and regulation of securities business,encourage financial intermediaries to pay attention to reputation value,and then indirectly regulate the M&A market,achieve effective governance of the securities market,and promote enterprises to develop in a high-quality way.
作者
洪祥骏
赵婧
马征
Hong Xiangjun;Zhao Jing;Ma Zheng(School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University;Economics and Management School of Wuhan University;CITIC Securities Company Limited)
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期86-105,共20页
Economic Review
关键词
处罚性监管
财务顾问
声誉损失
并购绩效
政治资源
Regulatory Punishment
Financial Advisor
Reputation Damage
M&A Performance
Political Resource
