摘要
利用奥尔森的集体行动理论分析中国的农村水环境治理问题。结果表明,农村水环境治理作为一种公共物品,需要村民、企业、地方政府的共同参与,但各主体在行动中为了实现各自的利益都出现了"搭便车"的行为。实现农村水环境的有效治理,需要建立完善的公众参与激励机制、企业激励机制、地方政府激励机制,克服各治理主体的"搭便车"行为,增强主体参与农村水污染治理的意识和行动能力,实现农村水环境的可持续发展。
Using Olson’s collective action theory,China’s rural water environment governance issues were analyzed.The results show that rural water environment governance,as a public good,requires the participation of villagers,enterprises and local governments.However,in order to realize their own interests,all the main bodies have appeared to“free ride”.To achieve effective governance of the rural water environment,it is necessary to establish a perfect public participation incentive mechanism,enterprise incentive mech⁃anism and local government incentive mechanism to overcome the“free rider”behavior of each governance subject,enhance the sub⁃ject’s awareness and action ability to participate in rural water pollution governance and realize sustainable development of rural wa⁃ter environment.
作者
刘亦楠
LIU Yi-nan(School of Public Administration,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)
出处
《湖北农业科学》
2020年第11期186-190,共5页
Hubei Agricultural Sciences
关键词
农村水环境
治理
集体行动
选择性激励
rural water environment
governance
collective action
selective incentive
