摘要
利用Stackelberg博弈模型模拟政府与企业之间的博弈过程,研究了政府对企业和消费者征收碳税的最优比例,探究了企业的最优产量、减排量、利润和社会福利等随碳税税率的变化规律,采用数值模拟验证了政府在不同条件下进行碳税比例选择的最优决策。结论显示:当碳税率低于某临界值时,政府的最优决策是仅对企业征收碳税;当碳税率高于另一临界值时,政府的最优决策是仅对消费者征收碳税;当碳税率介于两个临界值之间时,政府的最优决策是按一定的最优比例对消费者和企业征收混合式碳税。
This paper uses the Stackelberg Game Model to simulate the game process between government and enterprises,and studies the optimal ratio of government carbon tax on enterprises and consumers.It also studies the changes of the enterprises’optimal output,emission reduction,profit and social welfare with the carbon tax rate,and verifies the government’s optimal decision under different conditions by carrying out numerical calculations.The result shows that when the carbon tax rate is lower than a critical value,the governments optimal decision is to impose a carbon tax only on enterprises;when the carbon tax rate is higher than another critical value,the governments optimal decision is to impose a carbon tax only on consumers;when the carbon tax rate is between two critical values,the governments optimal decision is to impose a carbon tax on both consumers and enterprises at a certain optimal ratio.
作者
唐文广
袁晓晖
郝娜
TANG Wen-guang;YJJAN Xiao-hui;HAO Na(College of Science,Tianjin University of Commerce,Tianjin 300134;School of Economics,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第7期94-100,共7页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(11901432)
天津市社会科学规划项目(TJYJ18-023)。
